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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
The macroeconomic cycle is an attractive subject of study in the field of 
economics. Identifying the sources of business cycle fluctuations is an important step for 
macroeconomic policy making. Most economic textbooks agree that the economic cycle 
is the result of variations to the equilibrium of aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate 
demand (AD) functions of an economy. However, there are still debates on 
macroeconomic theories. In general, classical and new classical theories do not allow the 
possibility that except for surprises, output can deviate from capacity for very short 
intervals if the price level can adjust so quickly as to eliminate the gap between AS and 
AD. On the other hand, Keynesian economists contend that the presence of market 
imperfection (i.e., nominal rigidities, regulation restrictions, as well as market immobility, 
etc.) makes room for phenomena that could potentially explain most short-run 
fluctuations in GNP, and that can not captured by equilibrium models. 
Keynesian theories indicate that in the short run the effective demand of economic 
agents determines the level of output produced, yet there may exist disequilibrium in the 
economy if price flexibility and the mobility of markets are not sufficient to eliminate the 
gap between aggregate supply and aggregate demand at that time period. During the 
disequilibrium, the economic agents who perceived the gap slowly adjust their behavior 
to eliminate the deviation back to the long run equilibrium for the following periods. 
This is the so-called economic cycle. In order to capture this feature, error correction 
mechanisms, known as error correction models, were developed to reconcile the short-
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and long-run behavior of economic variables. In recent years, distributed lag theory has 
been gaining popularity. The principle behind this is that there often exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship among economic variables. In the short run, however, there may 
be disequilibrium. With error correction mechanisms, a proportion of the disequilibrium 
in that period is corrected in the next period because economic agents cannot be aware of 
the current economic situation until information is available during next period ( e.g., 
lagged information, adjustment bias .and expectational mechanism). For instance, the 
excess demand may be corrected by the change of price level in the next period, and the 
change of income may influence the change of consumption in the next period. 
Most economic theories explain that the reason economic variables deviate from 
their long-run equilibrium in the short-run is that there exist unanticipated economic 
shocks that impact the markets of an economy in a propagation mechanism. The 
propagation impulse framework has come to dominate the analysis of economic 
fluctuations. In this mechanism, Slutsky (1937) indicated, the fluctuation is the result of 
small and large, white noise shocks--impulses-- that affect the economy through a 
complex dynamic propagation system. Incorporated with the idea of an error correction 
mechanism, the propagation theme can be captured by the vector autoregression model 
developed by Sims (1980). The VAR is a reduced-form time series model of the economy 
that is estimated by ordinary least squares. Initial interest in VARs arose because 
economists could not agree on the economy's true structure. VAR users thought that the 
models could reveal important dynamic characteristics of the economy without imposing 
structural restrictions from a particular economic theory. As Sims indicated, impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions illustrate the dynamic characteristics of 
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empirical models. Some economists believed that these two dynamic components were 
unrelated to economic theories. However, Cooley and LeRoy (1985) argued that this 
method, which is often described as atheoretical, actually implies a particular economic 
structure that is difficult to reconcile with economic theory. 
This criticism leads to the development of a Structural VAR approach by 
Bemanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), Sims (1986), and others. The crucial 
difference between atheoretical and structural VARs is that the latter yield impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions that can be given structural 
interpretations. This technique allows the researcher to use different economic theories to 
transform the reduced form VAR residuals into the structural identification by imposing a 
system of structural contemporaneous/or long run restrictions. The estimation of these 
contemporaneous equations is used to transform reduced-form residuals into structural 
innovations. On the other hand, Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
utilized long-run restrictions to identify the economic structure from the reduced form. 
Their model demonstrates long-run characteristics that are consistent with theoretical 
restrictions used to identify parameters as well as sensible short-run properties. 
Blanchard and Watson (1986, p.124) indicate that research on impulse 
mechanisms centered on two main categories. The first concerned the number of 
impulses: was there only one source of shocks to the economy or many? Monetarists 
often singled out monetary shocks as the main source of business fluctuations. This 
theme had been empirically examined by many dynamic factor analysis models. The 
alternative view that there were many important sources of shocks was echoed by many 
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researchers, such as Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gamber and Joutz (1993), and Karras 
(1993). 
The second question concerns how the shocks lead to fluctuations. One view is 
that the accumulation of small, seemingly unimportant shocks can lead to economic 
fluctuations similar to the fluctuations caused by infrequent large shocks. That is, the 
accumulation of small shocks could generate data that mimic the fluctuations of 
macroeconomic time series. The other view, which underlies many policy discussions, is 
that there are infrequent large identifiable shocks that dominate all others. Blanchard and 
Watson (1986) indicated that economic fluctuations can be ascribed to particular large 
shocks amid the return of the economic variables to their equilibrium in the following 
periods. 
Blanchard and Watson use two approaches to examine the two questions. The 
first approach specifies and estimates a structural model, and examines the characteristics 
of the shocks as well as calculates their contributions to economic fluctuations. They 
concluded that fluctuations are due to fiscal, money, demand, and supply shocks in 
roughly equal proportions. Their model shows evidence against the small-shock 
hypothesis. 
Their second approach tests one of the implications of the small-shock 
hypothesis. The idea is that if economic fluctuations arise from an accumulation of small 
shocks, business cycles must be alike to some extent. Their conclusion is that business 
cycles are not all alike. But they indicated that the conclusion is not strongly against the 
small-shock hypothesis; instead, it just provides mild support in favor of the view that 
large specific events dominate individual cycles. Blanchard and Watson (1986, p.125) 
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also indicate that the primary concern is not an economy characterized by large shocks 
and a gradual return to equilibrium, but rather an economy with infrequent large shocks as 
well as many small shocks. 
Providing that structural VARs may unlock economic information embedded in 
the reduced-form time series model, one can construct contemporaneous structural 
equations based on most accepted macroeconomic theories to find the variables that cause 
the economic cycles. Even though there is considerable disagreement and debate, as 
Karras (1993, p.48) indicates, "most macroeconomists today would agree with the 
following propositions: (1) aggregate supply disturbances have permanent effects on 
output, (2) aggregate demand disturbances have mainly temporary (short- and medium-
term) effects on output, (3) aggregate demand and supply disturbances affect inflation in 
the short run, and (4) inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long run." Therefore 
using structural equations with macroeconomic constraints based on most accepted 
propositions, one can find the orthogonal structural shocks derived from the just 
identifying structural equations to construct the dynamic innovations of the variables. By 
employing the so-called structural vector autoregression (SVAR) technique, this paper 
tries to identify those variables that impact Taiwan's economy and to construct the 
dynamic innovations caused by these variables. In Chapter two, we introduce the 
theoretical background of structural VAR. In Chapter three, we review the economic 
development of Taiwan from 1971 to 1981. In Chapter four, we review the Karras model 
using oil, fiscal, (non-oil) aggregate supply, monetary, (non-fiscal, non-monetary) 
aggregate demand, and exchange rate shocks for the case of U.S. and extend his research 
to 2001. In Chapter five, we also compare the Choleski model with the restricted and 
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original Karras models for the case of Taiwan. Based on the restricted Karras model, 
Chapter six and seven investigate and compare the importance of the six shocks for Japan 
and Korea. Chapter eight compares the four countries and gives a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 From Structural Equations to Vector Autoregression-Sims's Criticism 
General statistical models usually estimate the exogenous parameters for the 
estimation of interested endogenous variables based on a sound theoretical background. 
This statistical method however may fail to identify the estimators of each exogenous 
variable when the so-called exogenous variables are to some extent correlated with each 
other. General economic models treat economic variables as random or stochastic 
variables whose properties can be described by probability distributions. Most conceptual 
frameworks for understanding economic processes and institutions recognize that there is 
a feedback between economic variables and that in economics everything depends on 
everything else. This translates into the realization that economic data that are the 
product of the existing economic system must then be described as a system of 
simultaneous relations among the random economic variables and that these relations 
involve current, future, and past (lagged) values of some of the variables. For this reason, 
Marschak (1950) contended that economic data are generated by systems of relations that 
are generally stochastic, dynamic and simultaneous. The doubt on exogeneity of 
economic variables had gained attention and led to the development of large-scale models 
based on macroeconomic restrictions to identify the parameters of the interested 
variables. 
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When contemporaneous correlation exists, it may be more efficient to estimate all 
equations jointly, rather than to estimate each separately. In dealing with large-scale 
models, statistical theories say that a model is identified if the distinct pattern of the 
parameters of the model's variables is well recognized based on economic theories (which 
is usually what we mean by a structural form for a model). If the parameterization we 
derived from economic theories fails to be identified, we can transform the structural 
equations into reduced form instead. This is called normalization. However, through 
normalization, Sims (1980) commented that the individual equations of the model are not 
products of distinct operation in economic theory. 
Instead of using reduced form, many economists normalize the large-scale models 
by requiring that the residuals of the model be orthogonal across equations and the 
coefficient matrix of current endogenous variables be triangular. Sims (1986, p.11) 
indicates that the parameter space of this model is acquired if its normalization into a 
Wold causal chain form is identified. This results in equations that are linear 
combinations of the reduced form equations. But Sims (1980, p.3) emphasizes the danger 
of one-equation-at-a-time specification of a large macroeconomic model. He indicates 
that the distinctions among equations in large macroeconomic models are normalization, 
rather than truly structural distinctions. 
In addition, Sims (1980, p.4) also emphasizes that macroeconomic models have 
rich sources of dynamic elements. He argues that the extent of rich sources of dynamic 
elements may weaken the few legitimate bases for generating identifying restrictions for 
the structural economic models. He contends that business behavior, when markets do 
not clear, must depend not only on hypothetical business demands and supplies given 
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current prices, but also on the excess demand ofWalrasian theory. This means that we 
cannot suppose that business behavior is invariant under changes in the public's taste. For 
example, if the excess demand or supply in the money markets enters the money supply 
decision of the Central Bank, the excess supply or demand of money acknowledged by 
business agents may also influence the dynamic money demand equation. 
Besides, Sims also indicated that rational behavior under uncertainty of business 
agents is likely to undermine the exclusion restriction that econometricians had been used 
to thinking of as reliable. For example, as Sims (1980, p.6) explains, "however certain 
we are that the tastes of consumers in the U.S. are unaffected by the temperature ( e.g. 
frost) in Brazil, it is possible that U.S. consumers might attempt to stockpile coffee in 
anticipation of the frost effect on price." Moreover, the change of a macroeconomic 
policy variable, as Lucas's critique showed (1977), is a rule for systematically changing 
that variable in response to market conditions, therefore institution of a nontrivial policy 
would end the exogeneity and change the expectation formation rule and the normalized 
reduced form. 
In summary, Sims (1980) proposed three criticisms of large-scale structural 
models: (1) most of the restrictions on structural models are false, and the models are 
nominally over-identified. That is, the restrictions on the structural model are neither 
unique nor distinct, if the so called exogeneity is in fact endogenous; (2) the rich sources 
of dynamic elements may undermine the legitimate restrictions when applied in 
identifying structural models; (3) under rational expectations, the change of policy 
variables as well as economic knowledge may also influence the behavior and 
anticipation of business agents. Sims's criticism on large-scale macromodels led to the 
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development of vector autoregression models for macroeconomic modeling. Sims 
proposed that even though most of the restrictions on existing models are false, and the 
models are nominally over-identified, it should be feasible to estimate large-scale 
macromodels as unrestricted reduced forms, treating all variables as endogenous (i.e., 
without restrictions based on supposed a priori knowledge). He admitted that the reduced 
form will be affected by false restrictions and may become useless as a framework within 
which to do formal statistical tests of competing macroeconomic theories. But, he 
indicated, much recent theoretical work shows that the resulting infection need not distort 
the results of forecasting and policy analyses with the reduced form. 
2.2 From Vector Autoregression to Structural Vector Autoregression 
VAR models have been popularized by Sims (1980, 1986) and many others. 
The hallmark ofVARs is innovation accounting and error variance decomposition. 
Innovation accounting ( or impulse response) refers to tracing the system's reaction to a 
shock (innovation) in one of the variables. For example, in a system of consumption and 
income, the effect of an increase of income may be of interest. We can trace out what 
happens to consumption ifthere is a one-unit increase of income in period zero and vice 
versa. 
Cooley and LeRoy (1985), however, criticized the atheoretical VAR method, 
mainly for its imposing theoretically improper restrictions. Thus, structural VAR was 
developed to come to its rescue. The structural VAR approach is a modification of the 
atheoretical VAR approach developed by Sims (1980). Since then, many researchers have 
studied how to identify the restrictions that have sound theoretical meaning so as to 
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recover the structural shocks. Sims (1986).proposed that the structural orthorgonalized 
innovations transformed from the estimated VAR residuals could be partly interpreted as 
the structural shocks such as policy regime changes. Bemanke (1986), Blanchard and 
Watson (1986), Blanchard (1989), Karras (1993), and Ahmed and Murthy (1994) 
estimated the unconstrained reduced form and use a set of just-identifying restrictions to 
transform the reduced-form innovations to a set of uncorrelated structural innovations. 
They use the identifying restrictions to give explicit structural interpretations. On the 
other hand, Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gamber and Joutz 
(1993) assumed that demand disturbances affect output in the short run but have no long-
run output effect, and supply .disturbances have long-run effects on output. As long as 
these restrictions are not over identifying, the same two-step approach can be used, along 
with the unconstrained reduced form in the first step, to identify the structural 
innovations. 
The structural VAR model, as shown by Keating (1992), is a simultaneous 
equations system that models the dynamic relationship between endogenous and 
exogenous variables. A vector equation of the general SV AR system, divided into 
contemporaneous endogenous variables and disturbances u, as well as lagged 
endogenous variables X,_1 , can be expressed as 
k 
(2-1) AX, = Icixt-i +Du,, i=1 
where u, is a vector of unobservable variables, which are disturbances to the 
contemporaneous structural equations. The square matrix, A, are the structural 
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parameters on the contemporaneous endogenous variables. C; is the ith square matrix 
polynomial in the lagged endogenous variables. 
The matrix D measures the contemporaneous response of endogenous variables to 
the exogenous variables if these exogenous. variables are observable, or disturbances if 
not. In theory, observable exogenous variables typically do not appear in VARs because 
Sims (1980) argued strongly against exogeneity. Therefore, u, are interpreted as 
disturbances to the structural equations. A reduced form for this system is 
k 
(2-2) X, =A-1LC;X,_;+A-1Du1 • 
i=I 
A particular structural specification for the disturbance u is required to obtain a 
VAR representation. If the structural disturbances (shocks) have temporary effects, u, 
equals &1 , a serially uncorrelated white noise vector 
(2-3) u, = &, . 
In theory the individual elements may be contemporaneously correlated; however, 
in the structural VAR process, they are typically assumed to be independent. 
Alternatively, the structural disturbances may have permanent effects on 
endogenous variables. In this case, u has a unit root process, that is 
(2-4) u, - u,_1 = &1 • 
Equation (2-4) implies that u equals the sum of all past and present realizations of 
& . Hence, shocks to u are permanent. 
Under the assumption that exogenous shocks have only temporary effects, 
equation (2-2) can be rewritten as 
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k 
(2-5) X, = LBiXt-i + z,, 
i=l 
k k 
where LB;= A-1rci and z, = A-1De,. The equation system in equation (2-5) is a 
i=l i=l 
VAR representation of the structural model. The last term in equation (2-5) is serially 
uncorrelated and each variable is a function of the lagged values of all the variables. The 
k 
VAR representation matrix, LB; , is a nonlinear function of the contemporaneous and 
i=l 
the dynamic structural parameters. 
If the shocks have permanent effects, the VAR model is obtained by inserting 
equation (2-4) into equation (2-2) and by applying the first difference operator ( Ii = 1-L) 
to the equation. We obtain 
k 
(2-6) M, = LBi!iXt-i + z,. 
i=l 
This is also a VAR specification ifwe can test that macroeconomic time series 
variables appear to have a unit root. This indicates that if the variables are stationary, 
equation (2-5) is used; if the variables appear to be a unit root, equation (2-6) is used to 
estimate the parameters. If some variables have temporary effects, while others have 
permanent effects, the selected VAR model has to reflect this feature. For example, 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) estimated a VAR model by assuming some variables have 
unit roots while others are stationary. On the other hand, King, Plosser, Stock and W3:tson 
(1991) use the feature that some linear combinations of the variables are stationary even 
though all variables have unit roots. 
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From equation (2-5) or (2-6), we know that as long as we can estimate the VAR 
k 
coefficient I B; and proper lags of k, as well as contemporaneous parameters in A and D, 
i=I 
we can calculate the behavior of parameters interested by converting the following 
equations 
k k 
(2-7) IBi = A-1rci. 
i=I i=I 
(2-8) s, = n-1 Az, . 
k k 
That is, IC; could be calculated from the estimated VAR coefficients IB; . 
i=I i=I 
The structural shocks & 1 could be derived from the estimated residuals z1 • Furthermore, 
the covariance matrix for the residuals, I z from either equation (2-5) or equation (2-6) 
IS 
where E is the expectation operator, and I e is the covariance matrix for the shocks. 
The estimation of VAR equation (2-5) or equation (2-6) can provide an estimate of 
I z • I z can be used for the estimation ofA, D and I e based on equation (2-9). For 
n variables in a structural VAR model, we have n(n+ 1)/2 unique elements in the 
symmetric matrix I z • Likewise, we have n 2 elements in matrix A and D respectively, 
and n(n+ 1)/2 unique elements in I e have to be solved according to equation (2-9). 
Thus the total unsolved elements on the structural VAR model are 2 n 2 +n(n+ 1)/2. 
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The maximum number of structural parameters has to be equal to the number of 
unique elements (i.e., n(n+ 1)/2) in L z • Besides, we have 2 n2 plus n(n+ 1)/2 unknown 
elements to be solved. This means that at least 2 n 2 restrictions must be imposed on 
matrix A, D, and Ls. Typically, we specify Ls as a diagonal matrix since the 
structural disturbances are assumed to be independent. This gives n 2 restrictions on 
equation (2-9). In addition, we can normalize the structural equations to make matrix A 
have diagonal elements equal to unity. The matrix D has the same specification as A 
since each equation has structural shocks. This gives an additional 2n restrictions. 
Therefore identification requires at least 3n(n-l)li restrictions based on economic theory. 
If Dis taken to be the identity matrix, we can have at least n(n-1)/2 additional identifying 
restrictions to be imposed on A. 
Structural VAR model methodology requires a two-step procedure. First, 
employing the ordinary least squares technique, we estimate the VAR model with proper 
lags of each variable to eliminate the serial correlation from the residual. Next, we use a 
sufficient number ofrestrictions imposed on matrix A, D, and Ls to identify these 
parameters based on equation (2-9). 
After the structural parameters are estimated, we can derive the dynamic responses 
of the variables to the shocks by impulse response functions and variance decomposition 
functions. This is known as the moving average representation (MAR). For example, 
take the VAR model in equation (2-5) rewritten as 
x, = B(L)X,_I + z,' 
1 This number is derived from 2 n 2 +n(n+ 1 )/2- n 2 -2n=3n(n-1 )/2. 
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where Lis the lag operator. Subtract B(L)X1-1 from both sides of this equation 
or 
[I -B(L)L]X, = z,. 
Multiply both sides ofthis equation by [I-B(L)Lr1 
X, = [I -B(L)Lr1 z,. 
From equation (2-8), we have z, = A-1 Ds,. Substituting into the above equation 
we get 
co 
(2-10) X, = [I -B(L)Lr1 A-1Ds, = "f/J;L; &,_;, 
i=O 
where each B; is an n x n matrix of parameters from the structural model. 
Equation (2-10) indicates that the response of xt+i to s, is B;. Hence, the sequence 
of B; from i = 0, 1, 2, ... , illustrates the dynamic response of the variables x, to the 
shocks. If the variables in x are stationary, then the impulse responses must approach 
zero as i become large. 
Variance decompositions measure the quantitative effect that the shocks have on 
the variables. It decomposes each variable's forecast error variance into the individual 
shocks. If E,_jx, is the expected value of x, based on all information available at time 
t - j , the forecast error is 
j-1 
x, - E,_ jx, =LB;&,_; . 
i=O 
16 
The information at time t - j includes all & occurring at or before time t - j and 
the conditional expectation of future & is zero because the shocks are serially 
uncorrelated. The forecast error variances for the individual series are the diagonal 
elements in the following matrix 
j-1 
E[(x, -E1_jx1 )(x1 -E1_jx1)'] = "J2B;L- 6 B;. 
i=O 
If eivs is the (v, s) element in B; and us is the standard deviation for disturbances 
(s = 1, 2, ... , n), thej-step-ahead forecast error variance of the vth variable is 
j-1 n 
E(xvt -Et-jxv/)2 = LLei~su;. 
i=O s=I 
The variance decomposition function (VDF) derives the j-step-ahead percentage 
of forecast error variance for variable v attributable to the kth shock 
j-1 
"J2Bi~kUi 
(2-11) VDF(v,k,j) =-j--il=_O_n __ _ 
L2L2ei~su; 
i=O s=I 
The same analysis can be used in equation (6). As shown in equation (10), we 
have 
(2-12) 
However, the response of x, rather than the change in x, is the main concern for 
economists. Therefore we need a little more manipulation for equation (2-12). By 
assuming that all the elements of & at time O and earlier are equal to zero, the impulse 
responses can be generated recursively as follows 
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Inserting the expression for x1, we get 
Repeating the operation for all x to x, yields the following 
t-j 
x, = Xo + B0&1 +(Bo+ B1)&1-1 + ···· + (LBj)&1. 
j=O 
The result is equivalently as follows 
t-1 
(2-13) x, = Xo + r(L )st = Xo + L rist-i , 
i 
where r. = "e. 
I ~ J 
j=O 
i=O 
The response of x1+; to & 1 is r;. Since LU:' is assumed stationary, theBjmatrix 
goes to zero as j gets large. This implies that r; converges to the sum of coefficients in 
B(L). Restrictions on this sum of coefficients are used to identify long-run structural 
VAR models. The variance decompositions for this model replace B in equation (2-11) by 
r. 
Impulse responses and variance decompositions are derived using parameters 
from an explicit structural economic model. If their dynamic patterns are consistent with 
the structural model used for identification, this would provide evid'ence in support of the 
theoretical model. Otherwise, the theory is invalid or the empirical structural approach is 
somehow misspecified. 
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2.3 Traditional Choleski versus Structural Approaches 
As Stock and Watson (2001, p.102) indicate, VARs come in three varieties: 
reduced form, recursive, and structural. A reduced form VAR expresses each variable as a 
linear function of its own past values of all other variables of interest and a serially 
uncorrelated error term. Thus, the reduced form can be estimated by ordinary least 
squares regression. The error terms in these regressions are the surprise movements in 
the variables after taking its past values into account. If the different variables are 
correlated with each other-as they typically are in the macroeconomic applications-
then the error terms in the reduced form model will also be correlated across equations. 
A recursive VAR constructs the error terms in each regression to be uncorrelated 
with the error in the preceding equations. This is done by judiciously including some 
contemporaneous values as regressors. For example, ina three-variable VAR ordered as 
(1) inflation, (2) the unemployment rate, and (3) the interest rate, the first equation for a 
recursive VAR takes inflation as the dependent variable, and the regressors are lagged 
values of all three variables. In the second equation, the unemployment rate is the 
dependent variable, and the regressors are lags of all three variables plus the current value 
of the inflation rate. The interest rate is the dependent variable in the third equation, and 
the regressors are lags of all three variables plus the current values of the inflation rate 
and the unemployment rate. The ordinary least squares estimation for each equation 
produces residuals that are uncorrelated across equations. This algorithm is equivalent to 
estimating the reduced form, then computing the Choleski factorization of the reduced 
form VAR covariance matrix, as proved by Liitkepohl (1993, chapter 2). The Choleski 
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approach employs the reduced form VAR residuals to identify the unique lower triangular 
matrix R, solving the following equation into orthogonal shocks 
This statistical decomposition depends on the sequence in which variables are 
ordered in Z. The residual covariance matrix from a VAR ordered by inflation rate, 
unemployment rate and interest rate yields a Choleski decomposition that is algebraically 
equivalent to estimating the following three equations by ordinary least squares 
The Choleski decomposition yields a system in which e, = Rv, . Each shock, v, , is 
uncorrelated with the other shocks, by construction. This system implies the 
contemporaneous restriction that the first variable responds to its own exogenous shock, 
the second variable responds to the first variable plus an exogenous shock to the second 
variable, and so on. 
The Choleski approach has been criticized by Cooley and Leroy (1985). First, if 
the Choleski decomposition is in fact atheoretical, then the estimated shocks are not 
structural and will generally be linear combinations of the structural disturbances, 
v, = R-1 e, = R-1 A-1u1 • In this case, standard VAR analysis is difficult to interpret 
because the impulse responses and variance decompositions for the Choleski shocks will 
be complicated functions of the dynamic effects of all the structural disturbances. The 
second attack claims that the Choleski ordering can be interpreted as a recursive 
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contemporaneous structural model. However, most economic theories do not imply 
recursive contemporaneous systems. A particular Choleski factorization of the covariance 
matrix for the results is appropriate only when theory predicts a contemporaneous 
recursive economic structure. 
A structural VAR uses economic theory to sort out the contemporaneous links 
among the variables. Structural V ARs require identifying assumptions that allow 
correlations to be interpreted causally. These identifying assumptions can involve the 
entire VAR, so that all the causal links are identified. This produces instrumental 
variables that permit the contemporaneous links to be estimated using instrumental 
variables regression. The number of potential structural VARs that fit the data is limited 
only by the ingenuity of the researcher. 
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CHAPTER3 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY 
The historical review of Taiwan's economy here is to set the step for application of 
the VAR to Taiwan. In this chapter, we review the economic development of Taiwan 
from "Dissertations of Taiwan Economic development" to find the possible shocks that 
impact Taiwan the most. These papers are from Kuo (1994), Soon (1994), Yu (1994), and 
many others etc.1 Their deliberate observations and research give a remarkable record of 
Taiwan's economic growth. 
3.1 Government's Economic Planning 
The strong economic growth of Taiwan since 1950 is well recognized. From 1950 
to 1991, its annual average real GNP was 6.4%. In 1991, nominal GNP reached $NT 
1802.7 billion. According to Soon (1994), Taiwan's government started its four-year 
economic planning in 1953. The economic plan can be divided into four stages. 
(1) Stage 1-- Controlled imports: from 1953 to 1960, Taiwan's economy developed its 
own industries by imposing restrictions on import goods and financial services, things 
such as high import duties and foreign currency exchange controls. 
(2) Stage 2-- Export expansion period: by encouraging investment for export oriented 
industries, from 1961 to 1972, the foreign market-oriented industries expanded 
1 These outstanding economists' research papers of Taiwan are collected into a book. Its title is 
"Dissertations of Taiwan Economic Development." 
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dramatically, contributing to tremendous trade surplus, as well as pushing Taiwan's 
economy into a high growth level stage. 
(3) Stage 3-- Import control and industrial restructuring: in this stage from 1973 to 1981, 
the government developed capital-intense industries such as semi-products, material 
refining and so on. Export-oriented industries still were the main objects supported by 
government's fiscal policies. 
(4) Stage 4-- Comprehensively and deliberately open economic policies: since 1991, the 
government comtnenced to remove financial and market restrictions, and to establish 
freely competitive markets by selling the government-run companies to the public. 
3.2 Oil Supply Shocks 
Despite the outstanding economic growth rate in the past 40 years, however, 
Taiwan's economy experienced two dramatic oil-supply shocks (Kuo, 1994). In 1974, 
Taiwan's economy was severely depressed by the first oil-supply shock in 1973. The 
price level rose by 22.9% in 1973 and 40.6% in 1974 and the real economic growth rate 
decreased from 12.8% in 1973 to 1.1% in 1974 and 4.2% in 1975. The second oil-supply 
shock began in 1979. The price level was inflated by 13.8% in 1979 and 21.5% in 1980. 
The second shocks decreased the real economic growth rate from 13.9% in 1978 to 8.1 % 
in 1979 and 6.6% in 1980 respectively (Table 3-1). 
According to Table 3-2, in general, money supply is highly related to the price 
level with time lags of one or two years, especially during the oil supply shock periods. 
In 1972 the money supply increased by 37.9%, while in 1973 the price level was up by 
22.9%. The money supply increased by 49.3% in 1973, and the price level increased by 
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40.6% in 1974. In addition, the money supply increased by 34.1 % in 1978, pushing the 
price level up again by 13.8% in 1979, and 21.5% in 1980 respectively. In order to deal 
with the severe impact of the oil supply shock on the economy, Taiwan's government 
increased fiscal spending to revive the depressed economy but adopted tighter monetary 
policy after its inflation. The contracting monetary policy brought down the price level; 
however, economic growth was also depressed during the following two years. 
Kuo indicated how the money supply is increased. She divided the sources of 
increased money supply into three categories: (1) the net change of foreign assets (NF A), 
(2) the net change of government fiscal balance and (3) the net change of excess money 
supply of banks (Table 3-3). The three categories are determined by international trade 
balance, change of government saving, and the change of the banks' loan and investment 
minus the change of their savings, transferable CD and net values. 
Kuo also discovered that in 1972,1973, 1978, and 1979: (1) the increase of net 
foreign assets (NFA) is the major source of the increased money supply; (2) the change of 
government debt or surplus decreases the money supply rather than increases the money 
supply; (3) the money supply was not highly related with the increase of bank loans 
except in 1973. In 1973 the high growth rate of bank loans and NF As contributed about 
50% of the money supply increase. The tremendous increase ofNFAs also was the main 
source of money supply growth in 1978. 
As shown in table 3-3, the increase of NF As is the primary factor for the growth 
of money supply. Kuo divided the increase of NF As into two parts--trade balance and 
basic balance. From Table 3-4, we can find that Taiwan had trade surplus and positive 
basic balance from 1970 to 1981 except 1974 and 1975. During the years of 
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extraordinary increases in the money supply, the trade surplus accounted for the important 
portion of the growth of GDP. That is, 8.2% in 1972, 6.8% in 1973, 5.4% in 1977, and 
8.3% in 1978. When the Central Bank tried to prevent the exchange rate from 
appreciation in order to keep the trade surplus, it has to sell domestic currency in the 
foreign exchange market. Therefore, the continued trade surplus caused the steady 
increase of money supply. The increased money supply not only pushes up the price level 
but also caused the capital outflow of the domestic saving to the other countries. 
The tremendous increase of trade surplus, based on open economy theory, can be 
primarily attributed to the real exchange rate. Kuo (1994) used effective exchange rate 
(EER) and purchasing power parity (PPP) to evaluate the factor, which impacted the trade 
balance in the 1970s and 1980s. 
(1) Purchasing power parity (PPP) 
PPP index is the comparison of the domestic price index relative to the price index of 
the other countries. Kuo chose the year of balanced trade and balanced basic account 
as the base year with index equal to 100. If the PPP index is greater than 100, it 
means the growth rate of the PPP index of other countries is higher than the rate of 
domestic price level and if less than 100, lower price level otherwise. From Table 3-
5, we can find out that the inflation rates of other countries are higher than Taiwan's 
during the 1970s except 1974. In 1970,1971, 1972, and 1978, Taiwan's inflation rate 
is relatively stable compared to the rate of other countries. 
(2) Effective exchange rate (EER) index 
EER index is the weighted average of exchange rate in terms of domestic currency 
relative to the other countries (i.e., the trade partners). An EER index higher than 100 
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means that domestic currency value increased in comparison to the currency values of 
Taiwan's trade partners. The opposite means the inverse relationship. From Table 3-
5, for the balanced trade and basic account as indicated by Kuo, we can choose 1980 
as the base year and the PPP and EER indexes are 100. 
(3) The real EER 
Taiwan's competitiveness of export goods can be evaluated by the real EER. That is, 
the EER index divided by the PPP index. A real EER higher than 100 indicates less 
competitive export goods and more competitive otherwise. Table 3-5 indicates that 
the real EER is lower than 100 except in 197 4 either in terms of export value or total 
trade value. This indicates that Taiwan's export industries had experienced their 
prosperity during 1970s. It also should be noticed that the real EER in 1972 and 1978 
is relatively low, this stimulated the tremendous increase of trade surplus, causing the 
increase of net foreign assets and the expansion of money supply. 
Before the two oil supply shocks, Taiwan's economic situation was in a stable 
growth stage with low inflation. The oil supply shocks sparked inflation and inflation 
expectations. Generally speaking, the high inflation rate during those years can be 
attributed to two main reasons: (1) the oil supply shocks caused the price increase of 
material and intermediate goods, which resulted in the overall price surge; and (2) the 
cumulative trade surplus before the oil shocks caused the tremendous increase of money 
supply. Without the excess money supply, the two oil shocks could not cause the overall 
price surge in such a short period. However, the overall price level could still be 
increased in the following seasons as the high oil price continued. In addition, in Taiwan 
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the control or prohibition of import goods as well as capital outflow to overseas might 
have exaggerated the severe economic situation at that time. 
3.3 Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
In order to deal with the impact of the two oil-supply shocks, according to Kuo 
(1994), Taiwan's government adopted the following fiscal and monetary policies. 
( 1) High interest rate 
With the high inflation rate since 1973, the government was obligated to increasing 
the interest rate on April and June 1973. The mortgage rate raised by 2 percentage 
points to 13.25% and discount rate raised by 1.75 percentage points to 11.75% 
annually. Despite all the adjustment of the interest rate, the anticipated inflation did 
not subside. The inflation rate still went up by 4% in a month. Saving accounts and 
CDs continued decreasing from October 1973. People did not like to hold money as 
stored value. It was on January 1974 that the inflation rate went up at 12.9% per 
month; therefore on January 27, 1974, the government again raised interest rates, as 
shown in Table 3-6. 
It is worth noticing that this interest rate policy had the following features: ( 1) 
the annual interest rates of CDs were raised by 3 .43 percentage points on average, the 
annual interest rates for loans were also increased by 3 .5 percentage points (2) the 
adjusted short-term (under nine months) saving interest rates (i.e., Three-Month CD 
for 11.5%, Six-Month CD for 12.5%, and Nine-Month CD for 13%) were higher than 
the former long-term (longer than one year) saving interest rates (i.e., One-Year CD 
for 11 %, Two-Year CD for 11.5%, and Three-Year CD for 12%); (3) after the 
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adjustment, one-year CD saving interest rates were 15%, higher than the interest rates 
for loans, 13.75% annually; and (4) the government bonds, the saving accounts and 
CDs issued before can be applied to the new interest policy. The high interest rate 
policy successfully eased the inflation pressure. fu Table 3-7, we can find that the 
amount of savings accounts and CDs started their increase since February 1974. The 
money flowed back into the banking system for the high interest rate policy. 
(2) Once-at-all oil price markup 
fu fall 1973, international oil prices went up dramatically. The international price 
level marched up with the strong anticipation of inflation overall the world. fu the 
beginning, the government-owned monopoly petroleum company, China Petroleum, 
was able to absorb the markup cost of crude oil prices. However the anticipated 
inflation made economic agents start to increase inventory for inflation speculation. 
Also, the oversupplied money in 1973 made the situation even worse. This caused 
the inflation rate to reach its peak on January 1974. 
fu order to deal with the inflation pressure, the petroleum company was obligated 
to raise the price of oil and its byproducts by an average of 88.4% and electric utility 
price by 78.7% on January 27, 1974. Although oil price increased, which increased 
costs and price levels, the price mark-up stopped people's speculation on necessary 
goods and materials. The growth rate of the price index was curbed and started to 
decrease on the following months (see Table 3-7). The inflation caused by the first 
oil supply shock was successfully controlled. 
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(3) Tax reduction 
The purpose of tax reduction in 1974 was to reduce the cost of products and to 
facilitate the recovery of the economy. The tax reduction brought about a NT$460 
million decrease in personal income taxes but an increase of value-added taxes about 
NT$100 million. The net income tax decreased by NT$360 million in 197 4. In the 
same year, the estimated import tax was also decreased by about NT$6.74 billion, 
accounting for about a 25% import tax in 1974. Table 3-8 shows the comparison of 
the estimated amount of tax reduction in 1974. The total amount of tax income 
estimated was decreased by about NT$11.1 billion, which is about 12.9% of annul tax 
income of the year, or accounting for 2.1 % of GNP in 197 4. The tax reduction effect 
was remarkable. 
( 4) Expanded government spending 
The Big-Ten infrastructure construction projects2 were under way in 1973 and were 
finished in 1979 as planned. The ten major public construction projects included six 
items of transportation constructions, three government-owned companies of 
investment in heavy industries like China Steel Corporation etc and one nuclear 
power electric plant. These investments more or less helped recover the depressed 
economy in 1974. These investments accounted for 4.5% of total amount of 
investment in 1973 and 1974 respectively, and 20% in 1975 and 1976. This expanded 
public spending increased domestic aggregate demand, and economic growth (Table 
3-9). 
2 The Big-Ten infrastructure plans are the biggest ten government's projects in public facilities in order to 
revive the depressed economy. The ten constructions commenced in 1973 and accomplished in 1979. 
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3.4 The Fiscal and Monetary Policies for Second Oil-supply Shock 
The impact of the second oil-supply shock was less severe than the first one. 
Taiwan's government did not take radical policies. These policies included cost-based oil 
price adjustment and flexible exchange rates and interest rates. These government 
policies proceeded as follows: 
(1) Price of oil and the other related goods 
The government's price policy of oil and the related goods was to reflect the cost of 
crude oil. From 1979 to 1981, the price of oil and electricity was adjusted up in order 
to reflect the cost of crude oil and to improve the efficiency of energy use. 
(2) Exchange rate 
In order to have the exchange rate reflect the market situation, on February 1979, the 
Central Bank of Taiwan switched the fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible 
exchange rate regime without interference unless necessary. The real effective 
exchange rate (REER) was one of the major indicators used to gauge the trend of 
exchange value of the New Taiwan dollar. 
(3) Interest rate 
The central bank set the highest and lowest rates of interest. However, the interest 
rate policy during the second oil-supply shock was to have the money market decide 
the interest rate. In order to let the interest rate fluctuate freely and closely with the 
money market situation, from November 1980 to December 1982, the central bank 
adjusted the interest rates ten times. 
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(4) Fiscal policy 
After the second oil supply shock, the government did not increase government 
spending for the reason that in one way the increased spending could exaggerate the 
situation of money supply and on the other hand fiscal deficit appeared at the first 
time in 1980. 
Although the second oil supply shock had less severe but wider and longer 
impacts on Taiwan's economy than the first one, the impact subsided under the free 
market mechanism. Since August 1982 the inflation rate decreased, and the economy 
recovered although Taiwan's government intervened less in the markets. Comparing the 
two experiences of oil supply shocks, we can observe that government control over those 
markets might smooth the fluctuation of the economy, yet it also may worsen the 
economic situation. As many macroeconomic theories postulate, money supply, fiscal 
spending and tax reduction, as well as the oil price have contemporaneous and lagged 
impact on the economy. The fluctuation of these four factors produce shocks on the 
economy and drive the economy away from the long-run equilibrium. 
3.5 Economic Model of Taiwan's Economy 
Every country has its own economic features. These features must be considered 
while setting up the macroeconomic model of a country. In this issue, Yu (1994) 
proposed his own observation of Taiwan's features as follows. 
( 1) Manufacturing for export plays a key role in economic growth 
Given its lack of natural resources, Taiwan has to develop its economy by importing 
raw materials, machinery, as well as elements or parts to manufacture goods in order 
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to export these finished goods for economic development. Since 1960, Japanese and 
U.S. industries exported their technology and original manufacturing equipment to 
Taiwan. Taiwan acted as the manufacturing center in the worldwide economy. This 
strategy stimulated the Island's economy and spurred economic growth. In the late 
1980s, the New Taiwan dollar appreciated dramatically relative to the US dollar. This 
reduced exports to the United States. In 1986, exports to the U.S. accounted for 48% 
of Taiwan's total exports. But in 1990, the amount decreased to 28%. However, 
exports to Southeast Asia, China, and Western Europe increased dramatically to offset 
the decrease. 
(2) Government Owned corporations 
The size of government owned corporations is tremendous in Taiwan. It includes 
electric power, banks, public utilities, steel, petroleum, etc. The prices of these 
products are controlled by government and highly related to economic growth, 
especially domestic oil price policy. The prices of these products not only influence 
domestic living standards but also affect the manufacturing cost of industries. The 
profit of government-owned companies plays a important role for fiscal spending. 
(3) Small and medium OEM (original equipment manufacturing) enterprises as the major 
reasons for economic growth 
According to government statistics, about 60% of exports on average are from small 
and medium OEM enterprises in Taiwan. Instead, big companies primarily 
manufacture semi-products for domestic markets. Since the small and medium 
enterprises are price takers in competitive world markets, the vigorous economic 
environment gave these small and medium enterprises to compete with each other. 
32 
Those who survived at that time have grown up to become important suppliers for 
their international partners like IBM, HP, and so on. 
(4) Rapid change of economic structure 
As a small and open economy, Taiwan's export industries have evolved every ten to 
twenty years. Before 1960, agricultural products were the primary goods for export. 
In 1970s, textile products became the most important industry for Taiwan's economy. 
Since 1980, electric products have been the major industries for Taiwan's economic 
growth. Under such rapid environmental change, Taiwan's small and medium 
enterprises were flexible enot1gh to survive in the competitive world markets. 
To identify the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations, it is important to know 
what kind of variables will affect those influential economic agents who determine the 
movement of aggregate supply and aggregate demand disturbances. Many economic 
scholars in Taiwan have researched the sources of factors that impact Taiwan's economy. 
Chan and Lan (1996) compared the factors of money supply, international oil price, GDP 
of Taiwan, GDP of U.S. and price indexes between Taiwan and the U.S., based on 
controlled floating exchange rate and fixed exchange rate regimes. They found that the 
floating exchange rate regime is better than the fixed exchange rate regime in protecting 
Taiwan's economy from those shocks. As one can see, the international oil price is an 
important source of business cycle fluctuations since Taiwan lacks this important natural 
resource. In addition, many economic theories and research have indicated that 
government intervention is an important measure to avoid the economy deviating from 
long-run equilibrium. Policy variables such as monetary and fiscal policy, as well as 
exchange rate policy, are among the primary factors that impact the behavior of most 
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economic agents and in tum the fluctuation of AS and AD. In general, monetary 
disturbances are primary sources of economic fluctuations in the short run. Monetary 
authority tends to increase money supply to stimulate the economy during recession and 
decrease the supply to cool down an overheating economy. Many economists argued that 
the increase of money supply would stimulate the economy through money illusion and 
lower interest rates in the short run. In the long run, however, economic agents would 
rearrange their assets against the expected long-run inflation. This kind of capital 
arrangement continues until the economy reaches its long-run equilibrium. 
Moreover, money supply may be affected by fiscal policies, exchange rate policies and 
the price level. Increased fiscal deficits may decrease money supply if government borrows 
money from private saving, and this may have a crowding out effect on the economy; 
however, if the deficits are monetized (financed by printing money), the money supply may be 
increased. In addition, fiscal policy is always in accordance with the short-term economic 
cycle, especially when severe recession occurs. In such a situation, government tends to 
increase spending to revive the depressed economy. But with lagged economic information, 
government's fiscal spending might not be under way at the right time. 
When the Central Bank avoids the exchange rate deviating from the target zone, 
monetary policy might be affected. For example, if the Central Bank wants to keep its 
currency from appreciation due to tremendous trade surplus, the authority needs to sell its 
currency at the foreign exchange rate market. This will cause the increase of domestic money 
supply. On the other hand, monetary supply always adjusts to accommodate the transaction 
needs in the long run. 
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CHAPTER4 
KARRAS MODEL--THE CASE OF U.S. REVISITED 
4.1 Introduction to Karras Model 
Karras (1993) constructs a just-identifying structural VAR model for the U.S. 
using six macroeconomic variables. These are oil price, GNP price deflator, money 
supply, real GNP, government deficit, and nominal exchange rate. As in Karras's setting, 
these variables are used to examine the structural shocks and dynamic innovations for 
each variable in the model. The original feasible structural VAR operation for Karras's 
model is set up as follows: lacking natural crude oil, the economy (output) tends to 
fluctuate with the variation of the international oil price, which is categorized as an oil 
shock. On the other hand, the other important sources of structural shocks, according to 
macroeconomic economic theory, are termed as non-oil shocks, including fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, (non-oil) aggregate supply, (non-fiscal, non-monetary) aggregate 
demand and exchange rate, respectively. Aggregate demand innovations include shocks 
to private spending (consumption and investment), and aggregate supply shocks include 
technological and labor market disturbances. These structural VAR equations are 
restricted so as to identify the dynamic innovations and structural variance based on a 
generally accepted macroeconomic model. 
The structural VAR (SV AR) employs a two-step approach. The first step is to 
employ the VAR technique. One can obtain the covariance matrix L 2 from the 
residuals of the estimated reduced-form model (i.e., Eq.4-4). Since the covariance matrix 
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contains the mixed correlation of the six sources of shocks, Karras converted the 
covariance matrix into independent structural shocks by a system of just-identifying 
contemporaneous equations according to macroeconomic theory. The specification of the 
contemporaneous structural equations is extremely important to give the interpretation of 
the dynamic innovation for each variable. The underlying assumption is that the 
economy's behavior is primarily captured by the system of structural equations, which 
transforms the V AR's covariance matrices into systematically uncorrelated structural 
shocks I u •1 The original structural model is specified as follows 
(4_1) [o'] ±[ o O'J[O,_;J [u:] 
A Y, = i=t c; C; Y,_; + D u{ ' 
Where Y = (f,p,m,y,e)', and U = (u 0 ,uY)' = (u 0 ,Uf ,Us ,Um ,Ud ,ue)' is the Vector Of 
the six structural disturbances: oil price, fiscal deficit, money supply, aggregate demand, 
aggregate supply, and exchange rate. A is the matrix for the contemporaneous equations, 
and k is the proper lags on each variable. The structural shocks are assumed to be 
uncorrelated and Dis an identity matrix. Therefore, Lu = E(u,u~) is assumed to be 
diagonal if s = t, and equal to zero otherwise. The oil price is assumed independent of 
the other variables. The inclusion of this variable allows an evaluation of the effect of oil 
price fluctuations on variables such as aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The 
structural systems of equation ( 4-1) may be normalized by setting diagonal elements of 
matrix A as unity. That is 
1 However, any misspecification of the economic theoretic restrictions on contemporaneous structural 
equations may result in the improper inference about the structural shocks and their dynamic innovation. 
36 
(4-2) [at] ±[ 0 O'][OHJ· [u:] A .l't = i=I C; C; )'t_; + u{ · 
The estimated reduced-form model is rewritten as 
(4-3) 
or it can be rewritten as 
k 
(4-4) xt = LBiXt-i + zt' 
i=I 
where 
and z = (o,f,p,m,y,e) are the estimated residuals. Equation (4-4) is a standard 6-
variable VAR with the only exception that the growth rate of oil price is assumed to be 
white noise. Thus, all the right hand side variables of the sixth equation, including the 
lags of oil price itself, have coefficients constrained to zero. The procedure of SV AR is 
used to obtain the structural shocks (u) from the reduced form residuals (z). Equation 4-4 
indicates that 
Equation (4-5) indicates that an estimate of the orthogonalized contemporaneous 
system of structural equations ( elements of matrices, A) can be used to identify the 
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diagonalized structural shocks u. Therefore, we can restrict the 15 upper off-diagonal 
elements of matrix A to be zero and have a maximum of 15 nonzero parameters A (lower 
off-diagonal elements) in equation (4-5). Thus, the matrix A is an orthogonalized matrix 
with all Is in the diagonal elements and 15 nonzero parameters as the lower triangle 
elements. A plausible set of contemporaneous restrictions of the linear model set up by 
Karras is 
o=u0 t 
f =f(y) 
m = m(f,y,p) 
yd = yd (p,o,f,m) 
e = e(o,f,m,y,p). 
This model implies that the oil price, o , does not depend on any other variable. 
The fiscal variable, f , may depend on y because tax revenues are likely to be procyclical 
and government spending countercyclical. The aggregate supply, ys, tends to increase 
with price deflator, p, and decrease with oil price, o . The money supply may be affected 
by both real and nominal factors: real GNP, y, fiscal policy, f, and GNP deflator, p. 
The aggregate demand is also captured by both real and nominal factors ( o, f, m, p ). 
And the fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate, e , is allowed to be affected by all the 
other five variables(o,/,m,p,y). Thus the explicit model is as follows 
(4-6) 0 0 z, =u, 
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(4-7) 
(4-8) 
(4-9) 
(4-10) 
(4-11) 
The specification of the contemporaneous model is important to convert the VAR 
residuals into structural shocks. The identification of structural VAR disturbances 
requires the contemporaneous coefficient matrix be restricted to 15 ( or under 15) nonzero 
coefficients for the just identified model.2 Many alternative models have been tried so as 
to find the best estimates. The model selection criteria are based on: (1) most accepted 
macroeconomic theories, for example, aggregate demand should be negatively related to 
the GNP deflator, and aggregate supply positively related; (2) the value of R-square 
statistics; (3) an F-test on the selected model; and (4) the significance level of coefficients 
for all competing variables in the model. 
According to the structural VAR, identification of the contemporaneous equations 
is used to convert the correlated VAR residuals into structural innovations of which is 
demonstrated in equation (4-12) 
2 If more than 15 zero coefficients restricted in the contemporaneous coefficient matrix, the Structural VAR 
model is over identified. If less than 15 zero coefficients restricted, the Structural VAR model cannot be 
identified. 
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Or in detailed expression: 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 a2 0 aod aop aom aoy aoe 
0 1 0 0 a1 0 ado a2 d adp adm ady ade 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 apo apd a2 p apm a PY ape 
0 a4 as 1 a6 0 amo amd amp a2 m amy ame 
a1 as a9 a10 1 0 ayo ayd aYP aym a2 y aye 
all a12 a13 a14 a1s 1 aeo aed (Yep (Yem aey a2 e 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 a1 0 0 u2 f 0 0 0 0 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 = 0 0 u2 0 0 0 p 
0 a4 as 1 a6 0 0 0 0 u2 m 0 0 
a7 as a9 a10 1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 y 0 
all a12 a13 a14 a1s 1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 e 
Therefore, equation (4-12) can be used to identify structural shocks 
( u 0 , u 1 , uys, um, uyd, ue ). With all the structural shocks recovered, we can proceed to 
calculate impulse response functions and variance decomposition functions as shown in 
chapter 2. Notice that the VAR procedure is normalized on price level. Thus, the 
cumulated IRFs of the price level, money a:sgregate, RGNP, and exchange rate show their 
relationship to the price (inflation) shock. 
4.2 Empirical Results from Karras 
The estimation period for the U.S. employed by Karras (1993) is from 1973:1 to 
1989:4. The data are seasonally adjusted. fu his model, Y is the logarithm of real GNP 
and/is the logarithm of the real government deficit. The seasonally adjusted federal 
government surplus is negative for the whole period, and thus the logarithm of the deficit 
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is well defined. P is the logarithm of the GNP price deflator. E denotes the logarithm of 
the SDR per U.S. dollar. 0 is the logarithm of the oil price deflated by P. M2 is the 
logarithm of monetary aggregates. 
Karras employed his restricted model (al=O, a9+a10=0, and include the 
exchange rate in the money equation) to recover the six structural shocks, which are used 
to generate the impulse response and variance decomposition functions. Table 4-1 shows 
that the variance decompositions for the six variables of interest, and in parentheses, 
standard deviations obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. The numbers reported indicate 
the percentage of the forecast error in each variable that can be attributed to each of the 
structural innovations at different horizons. The percentages are reported for only four 
horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter ahead), the medium run 
( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). Also notice that the AS and 
AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and non-fiscal, non-monetary 
aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
For the variance decompositions (Karras's results) non-oil aggregate supply 
innovations have the greatest impact on output at all horizons whereas oil shocks gain 
importance in the medium and long run. Demand-side shocks also contribute to output, 
and monetaryinnovations have the greatest impact among them. 
Regarding inflation, money shocks dominate at all horizons, especially in the long 
run. Aggregate supply disturbances have effects that decrease over time. With respect to 
the exchange rate, relatively high degree of persistence is exhibited. Even in the five-year 
horizon the exchange rate is 48% explained by its own innovation. Monetary shocks 
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appear to be more responsible for exchange rate changes than fiscal shocks at all 
horizons. 
For the impulse response functions, aggregate supply (oil and non-oil) shocks are 
again seen to be the dominant source of output response. Consistent with theory, their 
effects on output are permanent. On the contrary, the response of output to demand-side 
shocks eventually die out. The response to monetary innovations has the expected hump-
shaped effect on output with a peak after 3 quarters. After that, their effect steadily 
diminishes. On prices, money supply shocks also have the expected effects becoming 
dominant in the long run. Oil shocks lead to a permanent higher price level, but only 
higher money growth produces a permanently higher inflation rate. Fiscal innovations 
appear to be neither strongly expansionary nor inflationary. 
Regarding the exchange rate, monetary shocks appear to be the major source of 
fluctuations and in the directions implied by theory, positive monetary shocks depreciate 
the dollar. On the contrary, the impact of fiscal innovations on the exchange rate appears 
to contradict the prediction of the Mundell-Fleming model: positive fiscal innovations 
(increases in the budget deficit) tend to also depreciate the dollar. 
Karras also shows that the three major contributors to the variability of output are 
oil, aggregate supply, and monetary shocks. Fiscal, other aggregate demand and 
exchange rate shocks have negligible contributions. Money is very important in the short 
run whereas supply shocks have long-term importance. The "snow-flake" theory (that no 
two recessions are alike) seems to be supported: the 1975 recovery is due to oil and 
aggregate supply; the 1980 downturn is a result of monetary policy with some 
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contribution from supply; negative contributions from oil, money, and supply produce the 
severe 1981-82 recession. 
Oil, money and supply shocks are also the primary forces behind the fluctuations 
of prices. Overall, monetary innovations are responsible for price level movements, both 
on a quarter-to-quarter basis and over the long run. 
Finally, the results also indicate that money disturbances have a lot of influence 
from quarter to quarter, but they are not responsible for the persistent appreciation of the 
dollar in the early 1980s or its dramatic depreciation after 1985. Those "swings" in the 
value of the U.S. currency are mostly explained by the exchange rate innovations 
themselves, which means that the puzzle of what drove the dollar in that period remains 
largely unresolved. The conventional view holds that higher budget deficits appreciate 
the currency because they lead to higher interest rates. But this view is not supported by 
the results ofK.arrras's finding. Karras (1993) contended that if budget deficits have no 
effect on the interest rate (for example, because Ricardian Equivalence holds) the 
exchange rate will not appreciate, and if a fraction of the deficit is financed by issuing 
money, higher inflationary expectations might lead to a depreciation. 
4.3 The Case of U.S. Revisited 
The estimation period for the U.S. is extended from 1973:1 to 2001:2. All 
variables are seasonally adjusted. In his model, Y is the logarithm ofreal GNP. /is the 
ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt subtracted from 
one. We use this manipulation because some of the seasonally adjusted budget deficits 
are still positive; in this case the log level of the fiscal variable is not well defined. P is 
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the logarithm of the GNP price deflator. Edenotes the logarithm of the SDR per U.S. 
dollar. 0 is the logarithm of the oil price deflated by P. M2 is the logarithm of monetary 
aggregates. Data for Y, M2 and Pare obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. Oil price is acquired from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics. 
The VAR procedure requires the data series of interest to be stationary. It is 
crucial for the estimation that the data series are stationary. The Dickey-Fuller's Zandt 
test as well as Dickey-Fuller's joint test of unit root are used to examine the stationary 
tests of all the variables. Table 4-2 presents the results of Augumented Dickey-Fuller 
tests on the log levels of the variables. The results find that the first difference of 0, f, E, 
P, Y, M2, and M2/P are stationary. 
Based on Karras's results, a VAR was estimated in first differences of the log 
levels on O,f, P, M2, Y and E with oil price as a random variable. Several alternative 
specifications for the lag structure and determinants were tested. The VAR model with a 
constant and four lags are adopted. 
Once the VAR is estimated and the reduced-form residuals are obtained, the 
contemporaneous equations are estimated in order to recover the structural shocks. The 
following estimation of the simultaneous equations employs two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), as employed in Karras's restricted model to recover the six structural shocks of 
which are used to generate the impulse response and variance decomposition functions. 
1. Oil price is restricted as a random variable. 
2. Deficit is also restricted as random variable so that z{ =i(. 
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3. Use 0 1 and t( as instrument variables for equation (4-8) to calculate 
4. Use 0 1 , t( and l{ as instrument variables for equation (4-10) to calculate 
5. Use 0 1 , t(, l{, and u: as instrument variables for equation (4-9) to run regression to 
6. Use 0 1 , t(, l{, u; and u: as instrument variables for equation (4-11) to calculate 
The estimated parameters show the quantified relationship among the dependent 
variables in the selected structural equations. Table 4-3 presents the estimated 
contemporaneous model presented in equations 4-6 to 4-11 for the M2 money aggregate. 
Many of the estimated coefficients are significant such as oil price and the GNP deflator 
in the aggregate supply equation; GNP deflator and RGNP variables in the money 
equation; and M2 money in the aggregate demand equation. 
In this restricted model, most of the signs are consistent with macroeconomic 
theory. Aggregate supply has a positive relationship with respect to the increase of price 
level and negative response to oil price, and the coefficients are significant. Aggregate 
demand has a positive response to the increase of the money aggregate at a highly 
significant level. It also has an inverse relationship with the GNP deflator, as 
macroeconomic theory postulates. In the money supply equation, the nominal M2 money 
tends to increase in response to the rising GDP deflator as well as real GNP; in addition, 
money supply also increases when fiscal expense increases. In the exchange rate 
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equation, it shows that the dollar tends to appreciate when oil price, real GNP, and GNP 
deflator increase and depreciate in response to the decrease of M2 money and fiscal 
spending. The empirical findings show that the signs of coefficients follow the most-
accepted macroeconomic theories. 
Once the coefficients of matrix A are estimated, we can identify the structural 
shocks and the dynamic innovation of the variables of interest through variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions. As long as the system's covariance 
matrix is diagonal or all structural equations are just identified, the relative efficiency of 
each alternative will be the same. The identification of the contemporaneous equations is 
used to convert the correlated VAR residuals into structural innovations which is 
demonstrated in equation (4-12): 
ALizA' =Liu. 
In detailed expression it is: 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 (Y2 0 (Yod (Yop (Yom (Yoy (Yoe 
0 1 0 0 0 0 (Ydo (Y2 d (Ydp (Ydm (Ydy (Yde 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 (Ypo (Ypd (Y2 p (Ypm (Ypy (Ype 
0 a4 as 1 a6 a1 (Y mo (Ymd (Ymp (Y2 m (Ymy (Y me 
as a9 0 a10 1 0 (Yyo (Y yd (]' yp (Yym (Y2 y (Yye 
all a12 a13 a14 a1s 1 (Yeo (J'ed (J'ep (Yem (Y ey (Y2 e 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 f 0 0 0 0 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 0 0 u2 p 0 0 0 
0 a4 as 1 a6 a1 0 0 0 u2 m 0 0 
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ue 
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Equation ( 4-12) can be used to identify structural shocks ( u0 , u1 , uys, um, uyd, ue ). 
With all the structural shocks recovered, we can proceed to calculate impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition functions as shown in chapter 2. Notice that in the 
VAR procedure, the VAR procedure is normalized on price level. Thus, the accumulated 
IRFs of the price level, M2, RGNP, and exchange rate show their relationship to the price 
(aggregate supply) shock. The following empirical :findings will be based on the 
restricted Karras model as above with the M2 aggregate. 
4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The variance decompositions and the impulse response functions quantify the 
importance of the structural disturbances for the variables of interest on average over the 
whole period of sampling. Significant economic events during the period may have 
profound impacts on the economic variables of interest. Table 4-4 presents the variance 
decompositions and mean squared errors for the six variables of interest. The numbers 
reported indicate the percentage of the forecasted errors in each variable that can be 
attributed to each of the structural innovations at different horizons. As in Karras (1993), 
the percentages are reported for only four horizons, which will be interpreted as the short 
run ( one quarter ahead), the medium run ( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 
quarters ahead). Also notice that for convenience the AS and AD shocks that follow 
represent non-oil aggregate supply and non-fiscal, non-monetary aggregate demand 
shocks. 
Oil price by construction is only affected by its own innovations. It is modeled as 
a random walk with no feedback from the rest of the other variables. Fiscal variation is 
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dominated by its own variation in all horizons. As to price level variation, as 
macroeconomic theory postulated, aggregate supply shocks are highly significant in the 
short term, gradually decay from about 53-17% variation in the long run; M2 money is 
getting more important in the long run, accounting for about 34-54% variation of 
inflation; while aggregate demand and exchange rate shocks are getting significant in the 
long-term. For monetary variation, aggregate demand dominates the variation of M2 
money during the horizons, from 87 to 68 percent. 
For the variation of aggregate demand ( output), it shows that the monetary effect 
accounts for 58-54% fraction of the variation during the horizons whereas aggregate 
supply also plays an important role for the variation at all horizons, from 27-24%. It is 
interesting to find that the monetary effect plays an important role for the U.S. demand 
variation in all horizons although it is not shown that aggregate demand has a dominant 
effect for the output variation in the short run; the exchange rate is explained around 80% 
by its own innovations in the five-year horizon; the others are found less significant for 
the variation. 
hnpulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of each structural disturbance. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 4-1 to 4-3. Figures 4-1 (a) to 4-1 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IRFs of output (real GNP) to the six shocks. Figure 4-1 (a) shows that the 
shocks of oil price decrease real GNP to -0.19 percentage points and the effect reduces to 
-0.12 percentage points in the medium and long run. Figure 4-1 (b) shows that fiscal 
innovations have small and positive effects on output in the short run and the effects are 
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0.2 percentage points in the medium and long run. Figure 4-1 ( c) illustrates that price 
(inflation) innovations decrease output, from -0.3 percentage points in the short run to 
-0.6 percentage points in the medium and long run. The responses of output to monetary 
innovations also are positive and decay over time as one might expect (Figure 4-1 (d)). 
The effects increase to 0.72 percentage points at third quarter, and decrease to 0.5 
percentage points in the long run. Figure 4-1 ( e) shows that aggregate demand shocks 
have only a short-term effect on output, as economic theory postulates. The effects 
increase to 0.2 percentage points at the first quarter, and decrease to -0.2 percentage 
points in the long run. Figure 4-1 (f) shows that the exchange rate shocks have positive 
effects on the output and the effects increase to 0.3 percentage points in the long run. 
Figures 4-2 (a) to 4-2 (f) demonstrate the price level response with respect to the 
six shocks. Figure 4-2 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price increase the price level over 
time and the effect grows in the long run. The effects increase the price level from 0.02 
percentage points in the short run to 0.18 percentage points in the long run. Figure 4-2 
(b) shows that fiscal shocks have positive effects on the price level in the first quarter. 
The effects drop to -0.1 percentage points in the medium run and -0.06 percentage points 
in the long run. This indicates that fiscal shocks have only mild impact on the price level. 
Price (inflation) shocks increase the price level over time (Figure 4-2 (c)); the price level 
increases from 0.15 percentage points in the first quarter to 0.35 percentage points in the 
medium and long run. Figure 4-2 (d) shows that the responses of price level to monetary 
innovations also increase over time as one might expect. The price level increases from 
0.1 percentage points in the first quarter to 1.4 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
4-2 ( e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the price level in the 
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short and medium run, as economic theory postulated, but in the long run the price level 
becomes negative. The price level reached 0.15 percentage points at the sixth quarter, 
and decreased to -0.35 percentage points in the long run. Figure 4-2 (f) shows that the 
exchange rate shocks have negative effects on price level and the effects reach-0.6 
percentage points in the long run. 
Figures 4-3 (a) to 4-3 (f) exhibit the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 4-3 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price appreciate the exchange rate 
by 0.9 percentage points in the medium and long run. Figure 4-3 (b) shows that fiscal 
shocks have negative effects on the exchange rate over time and the effects are from -0.35 
to -0.7 percentage points during the time horizon. Figure 4-3 (c) shows that price 
(inflation) shocks increase the exchange rate by 0.2 percentage points at the first quarter; 
the effects reach -0.2 percentage points at the fourth quarter, and increase to 0.3 
percentage points after the tenth quarter. Figure 4-3 (d) shows that the responses of the 
exchange rate to monetary innovations are -0.1 percentage points at the first quarter, 
increase to 0.17 percentage points during the second quarter, decay to -0.05 percentage 
points at the ninth quarter, and increase to 0.4 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
4-3 (e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the exchange rate, as 
economic theory postulated. The effects increase to 0.3 percentage points at the first 
quarter, decrease to 0.1 percentage points at the third quarter, and increase to 0.8 
percentage points in the long run. Figure 4-3 (f) presents that the exchange rate shocks 
have positive effects on the exchange rate and the effects reach 0.32 percentage points at 
the fifth quarter. 
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In summary, in the accumulated IR.Fs of output, we find that oil and price shocks 
decrease output; fiscal and monetary shocks increase output, as economic theory 
postulates. Demand shocks have temporary effects on output, as one might expect. In the 
long run, the effects become negative; this could happen if there is a fiscal budget 
. constraint during the time horizon. Surprisingly, exchange rate shocks do not decrease 
output during the time horizon. Monetary, and price (i.e., aggregate supply) shocks are 
among the most important sources of output fluctuations (0.6 percentage points compared 
to other shocks at 0.2 percentage points on average). Not surprisingly, the result shows 
that the U.S. economy ( output) during the sample period is not driven by aggregate 
demand and fiscal innovations, the demand side disturbances in a broad definition. Thus, 
this finding is in favor of the notion that monetary and technical innovations are mainly 
the sources of the output fluctuations. 
For the price level, oil, monetary and price (inflation) shocks increase the price 
level, while aggregate demand has only short run effects on the price level as one might 
expect. Money shocks are important sources of the change of inflation in the long run, 
and the effects are increasing over time, as macroeconomic theory postulates. The price 
level decreases in response to the fiscal and exchange rate shocks over all time horizons. 
This finding supports the view that the effect of the appreciation of the U.S. dollar may 
decrease the price of domestic goods. Since the U.S. has experienced a tremendous trade 
deficit over the last three decades, strong U.S. currency causes relatively lower prices of 
imported goods to domestic goods, which may decrease the domestic price level because 
the relative price of import goods is lower. In this situation, the cost of import companies 
decreases, and the profit increases. This benefits the economy in the long run. 
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For the exchange rate, oil, price, monetary and aggregate demand shocks tend to 
appreciate the U.S. currency in the long run, with only a slight effects on the exchange 
rate in the short run. Moreover, the impact of fiscal innovations on the exchange rate 
appears to depreciate the U.S. currency over the time horizon. This finding is against the 
popular notion of the Mundell-Flemming model, which proposes that increases in the 
budget deficit tend to appreciate the exchange rate; the conventional view holds because 
higher budget deficits lead to higher interest rates, and then appreciate the exchange rate. 
However, if budget deficits have no effect on interest rates (i.e., Ricardian Equivalence 
holds) or if a fraction of the deficit is to be monetized, as Karras indicated (1993), higher 
inflationary expectations might lead to depreciation. Moreover, the exchange rate 
depreciates in response to price innovations in the short run; this finding supports the 
notion that the price (inflation) shocks tends to depreciate the exchange rate. 
4.5 Summary and Contrast 
Karras (1993) estimated the period from 1973:1 to 1989:4 for the U.S. economy. 
He employs the restricted contemporaneous model to recover the six structural shocks of 
which are used to generate the impulse response and variance decomposition functions. 
We estimate the U.S. economy by imposing the same restrictions to recover the same six 
structural shocks during the period from 1973:1 to 2001:2. Despite most of the impulse 
response functions (IRFs) and forecasted error variance decompositions (FEVDs) for both 
models being similar, some significant differences do exist as follows. 
For the variance decompositions, Karras finds fiscal variation is explained by its 
own innovations; the same result is found even when the sample period is extended to 
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2001 :2. In Karras's findings, price variation in the short run is explained primarily by 
monetary, aggregate supply and aggregate demand disturbances. Aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand effect on price level decay over the time horizons, whereas the 
monetary effect is increasing in the medium and long run. In our findings, aggregate 
supply and money innovations are the dominant sources of price variation; their effects 
over the time horizons are the same as in Karras. 
In the monetary variations, our finding shows that only aggregate demand 
disturbances play a primary role, 87%-68% variation over all horizons. In Karras's 
finding, monetary variation is explained by primarily demand innovations, followed by 
monetary and oil innovations. Aggregate supply explains the major fraction of output 
innovations in Karras's results. In our results, money supply innovations are also found 
as the major explanation in output variation, and aggregate supply is the second important 
source of output variation during the sample periods. As to the exchange rate, both 
models have the same conclusion that exchange rate variations are from its own 
disturbances. This result indicates none of the other five structural shocks can explain the 
fluctuation of exchange rate. It indicates that exchange rate innovations remain 
unidentified in our model. In other words, there exist unidentified variables in explaining 
the exchange rate fluctuations other than the five variables in this model. 
In the accumulated impulse response functions, both results indicate that the 
responses of impulses of each variable to the six shocks respectively are as expected, 
except the extent of significant levels of each variable in the accumulated IRFs are 
different. For example, in the price level, both Karras's and our findings indicate 
monetary disturbances are the most important sources for the inflation. In the 
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accumulated IRFs of output, aggregate supply shocks and monetary shocks have the more 
significant effects on output fluctuations. For the exchange rate, both models indicate 
exchange rate is highly volatile to its own disturbances. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE CASE OF TAIWAN 
For the past fifty years, Taiwan has experienced tremendous economic growth 
with no recessions. Being an independent and small island, international trade is 
extremely important for Taiwan in that it accounts for a major part of Taiwan's economic 
growth. The economic identity is characterized as a small, open economy, but controlled 
by the ruling government through petroleum price controls, monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, exchange rate policy, as well as import and capital mobility barriers. Thus, it is 
worth evaluating the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations that impact Taiwan's 
economic growth. Based on the macroeconomic characteristics, we use the six variables 
ofKarras's model (1993) to set up a structural VAR model to identify the sources of 
shocks that impact the economy of Taiwan. 
5.1 Data and Implementation 
The estimation period for Taiwan is from 1981: 1 to 2000:4. In this model, Y is 
the logarithm of real GNP. fis the ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to 
government debt subtracted from one. We use this manipulation because some of the 
seasonally adjusted budget deficits are still positive; in this case the log level of the fiscal 
variable is not well defined. Pis the logarithm of the GNP price deflator. Data for Y and 
P are obtained from the Directorate General of Budgets, Account & Statistics, Executive 
Yuan. E denotes the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate - the SD Rs per unit of New 
Taiwan dollar. 0 is the logarithm of the oil price deflated by P. Oil prices are acquired 
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from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in International Financial Statistics. The 
logarithm of two different monetary aggregates will be tried for M: MJB, and M2, which 
are derived from the Economic Research Center of the Central Bank of Taiwan. 
The VAR procedure requires the data series of interest to be stationary. It is 
crucial for the estimation that the data series be stationary with the correct number of 
differences. The Dickey-Fuller's Z- and t-test as well as Dickey-Fuller's joint test of unit 
root are used to examine stationarity of all variables. Table 5-1 presents the results of 
Augumented Dickey-Fuller's tests on the log levels of the variables. The results find that 
the first difference of 0, f, E, P, Y, M2, and M2/P are stationary. 
Based on Karras, a VAR was estimated in first differences of the log levels on 0, 
f P, M2, Y and E, with oil price restricted as a random variable. Several alternative 
specifications for the lag structure and variable determinants were tested. Based on the 
tests of the lag structure and equation determinants, the VAR model with a constant and 
four lags was adopted. 
After the VAR is estimated and the reduced-form residuals are obtained, 
estimation of contemporaneous equations as in 4-6 to 4-11 occurs to recover the 
structural shocks. The same criteria are used as in the U.S. case to select the appropriate 
model for Taiwan. The estimated coefficients are shown in Table 5-2. Unfortunately, 
both estimated models used in Karras (1993) show that some of the signs of the estimated 
coefficients would be unexpected. For example, in the aggregate supply equation, 
aggregate supply does not positively respond to price level, no matter what variables are 
included in the equation. In addition, we also find that the signs of the coefficients in the 
contemporaneous equations are inconsistent for different time horizon. The estimated 
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coefficients on the contemporaneous equation reflect the economic situation over the time 
period. The signs of these estimated coefficients might be changed for different sampling 
periods. These signs might be inconsistent with the economic theories 
contemporaneously over different time horizons, which might undermine the structural 
VAR decomposition. 
Once the coefficients of matrix A are estimated, we can identify the structural 
shocks and their dynamic innovation of the variables of interest through variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions. As long as the system's covariance 
matrix is diagonal or all structural equations are just identified, the relative efficiency of 
each alternative will be the same. The identified contemporaneous equations are used to 
convert the correlated VAR residuals into structural innovations, which are demonstrated 
as in equation (4-12) 
A'J:.zA' =Lu, 
This equation can be used to identify structural shocks ( u0 , u1 , uys, um, uyd, ue ). 
With all the structural shocks recovered, we can proceed to calculate impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition functions. Notice that in the VAR procedure, it is 
normalized on the price level. Thus, the accumulated IRFs of the price level, M2, real 
GNP, and exchange rate show their relationship to the price (inflation) shock. 
5.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The variance decomposition and the impulse response functions quantify the 
importance of the structural disturbances for the variables of interest on average over the 
whole period of sampling observations. Significant economic events during the period 
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may have a profound impact on the economic variables of interest. It is important to 
notice what Taiwan's economy had experienced from 1981 to 2000. For example, four 
important events amid the sampling period had an impact on Taiwan's economy. First, 
the second world oil crisis since 1979 impacts the economy severely. The crisis 
decreased real GNP with higher price level for the following two years. Second, the 
dramatic depreciation ofU.S. currency relative to Asian currencies since 1989 impacts 
the export-oriented Taiwan economy. At the same time, foreign investment funds flowed 
into Asia, which caused domestic real estate prices to soar. The money prospered 
Taiwan's real estate industry and the stock market. Third, the Asian financial crisis 
( capital flee) since 1998 impacted heavily the economy of Asian countries (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, as well as Japan etc.). The event caused the dramatic 
exchange rate depreciation among almost every Asian country. Also, capital investment 
from Taiwan to Mainland China has been increasing since 1998; it caused price decreases. 
in real estate, decreases in domestic consumption and investment, and rises of 
unemployment rate as well. Fortunately, unlike the other Asian countries, Taiwan's real 
GNP was impacted less by the crisis due to the prosperity of the information technology 
(IT) industry from 1998 to 2000. The growth of the IT industry brought about the 
prosperity to Taiwan's electronic industries. On the other hand, government's ability to 
control the policy variables such as domestic petroleum price3, fiscal expense, money 
supply, and exchange rate may impact the estimation of contemporaneous equations. All 
3 In Taiwan, Chinese Petroleum Corporation, a public-run company, controlled the petroleum price. It is a 
monopoly market. 
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these impacts will be quantified on average_ into the six identified structural disturbances 
for the following variance decompositions and impulse response functions. 
The empirical findings that follow are based on the M2 aggregate for the restricted 
and original Karras models as well as the Choleski model. It is interesting to find that the 
two Karras models show similar results in the impulse response functions except for the 
monetary shocks. In the monetary shocks, the restricted Karras model shows more 
consistent results from a macroeconomic point of view. In comparing the Karras and 
Choleski models, from a macroeconomic point of view, Karras's models show more 
appropriate results both in the accumulated IRFs and the forecast error variance 
decompositions. 
5.2.1 The Restricted Karras Model 
The restricted Karras model (with restriction on al =O, a9+al O=O, and including 
exchange rate in the money equation, as shown in Table 5-2 (A)) is used to identify the 
structural shocks and impulse response functions (IRF) as well as forecast error variance 
decompositions (FEVD). The following estimation of the simultaneous equations 
employs two-stage least squares (2SLS), as employed in the restricted Karras model, to 
recover the six structural shocks of which are used to generate the impulse response and 
variance decomposition functions. 
(1) Oil price is restricted as a random variable. 
(2) Deficit is also restricted as random variable so that z{ =t(. 
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(3) Use 0 1 and i( as instrument variables for equation (4-8) to calculate 
(4) Useo,, i( and z{ as instrument variables for equation (4-10) to calculate 
(5) Use 0 1 , i(, z{ and u1 as instrument variables for equation (4-9) to run regression to 
(6) Use o,, i(, z{, u; and u1 as instrument variables for equation (4-11) to calculate 
The estimated parameters show the quantified relationships among the dependent 
variables in the selected structural equations. Table 5-3 presents the percentage of the 
forecasted errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the six structural 
innovations at different horizons. The numbers reported indicate the percentage of the 
forecasted errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the six structural 
innovations at different horizons. As in Karras's article (1993), the percentages are 
reported for only four horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter 
ahead), the medium run ( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). 
Also notice that the AS and AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and 
non-fiscal, non-monetary aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
Oil prices by construction are only affected by oil innovations. This is because the 
international price of oil is not affected by the other variables in Taiwan's 
macroeconomic model. Therefore, it is modeled as a random walk with no feedback 
from the rest of the variables. Deficit variation is explained by its own shocks over the 
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time horizons. On the price level, international oil price innovations account for about 
28-37% variation of inflation over all horizons. Aggregate supply shocks are more 
significant, about 61-51 % variation in the time horizons. In the monetary variation, 
monetary, exchange rate, oil, aggregate demand shocks dominate the variation at all 
horizons, especially in the short run; whereas oil shocks are significant in the medium, 
and long run. For the output variation, aggregate demand and exchange rate shocks 
account for the majority of variation, especially in the short run. It also shows that 
aggregate demand has the dominant effect in the short run. 
For the exchange rate, in the short run it is explained 73% by money innovations, 
decreasing to 55% in the longer run. Deficit shocks account for the exchange rate 
innovations around 20-17% during the 5-year time periods and oil price has little effect 
on exchange rate in the short-run, but it accounts for 12% in the medium- and long-run. 
hnpulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of each structural disturbance. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of the output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 5-1 to 5-3. Figures 5-1 (a) to 5-1 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IR.Fs of output (real GNP) to the six shocks. Figure 5-1 ( a) shows that the 
shocks of oil price increase output by about 0.2 percentage points in the short run and 
decrease output by -0.4 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-1 (b) shows that fiscal 
innovations have small and cyclic effects on output in the short- and medium- run and the 
effects reach 0.3 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-1 (c) presents that price 
(inflation) innovations do not decrease output until the third quarter, by -0.2 percentage 
points; the effects decay in the long run. The responses of output to monetary innovations 
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also are positive over time except in the first quarter; the responses increase to 0.5 
percentage points in the long run (Figure 5-1 (d)). Figure 5-1 (e) shows that aggregate 
demand shocks have positive effects on output, as economic theory postulates. The 
effects are 0. 7 percentage points at the first quarter, and increase to 1.4 percentage points 
in the long run. Figure 5-1 (t) presents that the exchange rate shocks decrease the output 
(-0.4 percentage points at the first quarter). In the long run, the effects increase output to 
0.3 percentage points. 
Figures 5-2 (a) to 5-2 (t) demonstrate the price level with respect to the six 
shocks. Figure 5-2 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price decrease the price level (at -0.4 
percentage points) and the effects decay to -0.3 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
5-2 (b) shows that fiscal shocks have positive effects on the price level over time. The 
effects increase to 0.35 percentage points in the long run. Price (inflation) shocks 
increase the price level over time (Figure 5-2 (c)); the effects increase the price level from 
0.6 percentage points at the first quarter to 1.2 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
5-2 ( d) shows that the responses of the price level to monetary innovations also increase 
over time as one might expect. The effects increase from 0.05 percentage points at the 
first quarter to 0.4 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-2 (e) shows that aggregate 
demand shocks on the price level are negative over time. The effects reach -0.25 
percentage points at the sixth quarter, and decay to -0.1 percentage points in the long run. 
Figure 5-2 (t) shows that the exchange rate shocks have a mixture of positive and 
negative effects on the price level in the short- and medium-run. The effects reach 0.15 
percentage points in the long run. 
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Figures 5-3 (a) to 5-3 (f) exhibit the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 5-3 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price appreciate the exchange rate 
over time. The effects reach 1.4 percentage points at the fourth quarter and decay to 0.2 
percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-3 (b) shows that fiscal shocks have positive 
effects on the exchange rate over time and the effects are from 1 to 2 percentage points 
during the time horizon. Figure 5-3 (c) demonstrates that price (inflation) shocks 
depreciate the exchange rate by 0.48 percentage points at the first quarter. The effects 
reach -0.9 percentage points at the sixth quarter, and decay to -0.7 percentage points in 
the long run. Figure 5-3 (d) illustrates that the responses of the exchange rate to monetary 
innovations are negative over time. The effects reach -2.4 percentage points at the first 
quarter, and rebound to -0.15 percentage points in the medium- and long-run. Figure 5-3 
( e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the exchange rate, as 
economic theory postulated. The effects increase to 0.15 percentage points at the fifth 
quarter, and increase to 0.18 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-3 (f) presents 
that exchange rate shocks have positive effects on itself over time and the effects increase 
to 0.12 percentage points in the long run. 
In summary, in the accumulated IRFs of output, the shocks of oil price decrease 
output in the long run. Fiscal and monetary innovations increase output in the long run. 
Price (inflation) innovations have cyclic effects on output and the effects decay over time. 
Also notice that the VAR procedure is normalized on the GNP deflator, thus the IRFs 
show that the decrease of output is related with the increase in price level. Aggregate 
demand shocks have long-term effects on output and are the most important sources of 
output fluctuations ( from O. 7 to 1.4 percentage points over time compared to other shocks 
63 
at 0.5 percentage points on average for the other shocks). This finding supports the 
notion that an export-oriented economy might experience higher output fluctuation due to 
the demand shocks from its trader partners. The responses of output to exchange rate 
shocks are positive in the medium- and long- run. Output has the expected responses to 
the monetary and demand shocks but the result contradicts the economic notion that 
monetary and demand innovations should have only short run effects on output. 
However, in an economy with rapid growth rate like Taiwan, people have rational 
expectation for the rapid growth; money and demand shocks may have long run effect in 
the accumulated IRFs. It is important to notice that Taiwan's economy has been growing 
(no recession) during the past four decades except in 2001. 
In the accumulated IRFs of the price level, oil shocks do not increase the price 
level over the time periods, as one might expect. However, if the oil shocks are only 
temporary, and people do not have the inflation expectation. In this situation, temporary 
oil shocks might not increase the price level. Fiscal and monetary shocks have positive 
effects on the price level over time, as macroeconomic theory postulates. Fiscal and 
monetary shocks are not the important sources of the inflation in the short run, while their 
effects are increasing over time. Price (inflation) shocks have the most significant effects 
on the price level among the six shocks, especially in the long run (1.2 percentage points). 
Aggregate demand shocks have mild and negative effects, and the effects decay in the 
long run. Exchange rate shocks have a mixture of positive and negative effects on the 
price level in the short run, and the effects are positive in the long run. 
In the accumulative IRFs of -the exchange rate, oil shocks appreciate the exchange 
rate over time. Against the case of the U.S., the impact of fiscal innovations on the 
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exchange rate appears to appreciate Taiwan's currency over time. As macroeconomic 
theory postulates, this finding supports the popular notion of the Mundell-Flemming 
model, which proposes that increases in the budget deficit tend to appreciate the exchange 
rate; the conventional view holds because higher budget deficits lead to higher interest 
rates, and then appreciate the exchange rate. Price shocks tend to depreciate the Taiwan 
currency in the time horizons, especially in the medium- and long- run. Monetary shocks 
significantly depreciate Taiwan's currency during the time horizons, especially in the 
short run. Aggregate demand and exchange rate shocks appreciate Taiwan's currency 
during the time horizon. 
It is interesting to notice that fiscal shocks have significant impact on the 
exchange rate over time. Price (negative supply) shocks impact the output only in the 
short run, and surprisingly the effect on the output is not significant as one might expect. 
Monetary shocks have mild effects on the price level and the output, but have more 
significant impact on the exchange rate. Demand shocks seem to have higher effects on 
the output and the exchange rate than one might expect; this finding supports the view 
that for an export-oriented economy, demand shocks from its trade partners have a higher 
impact on the output. Exchange shocks have only mild, short-run effects on output but 
have higher effects on the exchange rate itself in the long run. It is also interesting to 
notice that the exchange rate is more sensitive to the major economic shocks such as 
aggregate demand, fiscal and monetary shocks for the case of Taiwan. 
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5.2.2 The Original (Unrestricted) Karras Decomposition 
Estimation of the simultaneous equations employs two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
based on the original Karras decomposition, also shown in table 5-2 (B), proceeds as 
follows. 
(1) Oil price is restricted as a random variable. 
(2) Use 0 1 and z/ as instrument variables for equation ( 4-8) to calculate z/ =z{ -a,?. 
(3) Use 0 1 and z/ as instrument variables for equation (4-8) to calculate 
(4) Use o" z/ and l{ as instrument variables for equation (4-9) to run regression to 
(5) Use 0 1 , z/, l{ and u; as instrument variables for equation (4-10) to calculate 
(6) Use 0 1 , z/, l{, u; and u{ as instrument variables for equation (4-11) to calculate 
Table 5-4 present the forecasted error variance decompositions and mean squared 
errors for the six variables of interest. The numbers reported indicate the percentage of 
the forecasted errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the six structural 
innovations at different horizons. As in Karras's article (1993), the percentages are 
reported for only four horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter 
ahead), the medium run ( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). 
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Also notice that the AS and AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and 
non-fiscal, non-monetary aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
Oil prices by construction are only affected by oil innovations. Deficit variation is 
explained by money and its own shocks. It is unusual to find that money shocks are the 
primary sources for deficit variation unless that the deficit is financed by money printing. 
This finding might indicate that deficit is monetized (financed by printing money). On 
the price level, international oil price innovations account for about 24-33% variation in 
inflation for all horizons. Price (Aggregate supply) shocks are more significant, about 66-
55% variation for all horizons. Money shocks are not significant for price variations. In 
the monetary variation, aggregate demand shocks dominate the variation at all horizons, 
especially in the short run (65%), whereas oil shocks are also significant in the medium, 
and long run. For the output variation, deficit shocks account for the majority of 
variation, followed by aggregate supply and monetary shocks. It is not shown that 
aggregate demand has a dominant effect in the short run. 
For the exchange rate, in the short run it is explained 65% by its own innovations, 
decreasing to 4 7% in the long run. Monetary and aggregate demand shocks account for 
the exchange rate innovations around 10-18% respectively during the 5-year time periods, 
and oil price has little effect on the exchange rate in the short-run, but it accounts for 15% 
in the medium- and long-run. 
Compared to the restricted Karras model in which exchange rate variations are 
explained primarily by monetary shocks (73%-55%), the variation of exchange rate is 
explained by its own shocks at 65%. The reason for this is that in the restricted Karras 
model, the restrictions (al=O, a9+a10=0 and include exchange rate in the money 
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equation) give different estimates in the contemporaneous equations, which have 
influences on the forecasted error variance decomposition functions. 
Impulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of each structural disturbance. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of the output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 5-4 to 5-6. Figures 5-4 (a) to 5-4 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IR.Fs of output (real GNP) to the six shocks. Figure 5-4 (a) shows that the 
shocks of oil price increase output by 0.2 percentage points from the first to the third 
quarters and the effects reach -0.8 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-4 (b) shows 
that fiscal innovations have negative effects on output over time. The effects decrease the 
output (-0. 7 percentage points at first quarter) and decay to -0.3 percentage points in the 
long run. Figure 5-4 ( c) shows that price (inflation) innovations do not decrease output 
until the third quarter; the effects decrease output by -0.3 percentage points at the seventh 
quarter and decay in the long run. The responses of the output to monetary innovations 
also are positive over time; the responses increase to 1.4 percentage points in the long run 
(Figure 5-4 (d)). Figure 5-4 (e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects 
on output in the short run, as economic theory postulated; the effects reach 0.2 percentage 
points at the first quarter, but drop to -0.6 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-4 
(f) presents that the exchange rate shocks decrease output to -0.4 percentage points at the 
sixth quarter. In the long run, the effects decay to -0.3 percentage points. 
Figures 5-5 (a) to 5-5 (f) demonstrate the price level response with respect to the 
six shocks. Figure 5-5 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price decrease the price level (at -
0.4 percentage points on average) in the short and long run and the effects are -0.3 
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percentage points on average in the medium run. This result is not as one might expect. 
However, if the oil price shocks are just temporary, economic agents may not have 
inflation expectation. The price level might not increase. Figure 5-5 (b) shows that fiscal 
shocks have positive effects on the price level over time. The effects increase to 0.38 
percentage points in the long run. Price (inflation) shocks increase the price level over 
time (Figure 5-5 (c)). The effects increase the price level from 0.6 percentage points at 
the first quarter to 1.2 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-5 ( d) presents that 
monetary innovations do not increase the price level until the eleventh quarter; however, 
the price level increases to 0.2 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-5 ( e) shows 
that aggregate demand shocks increase the price level in the short- and medium- run. The 
effects reach 0.1 percentage points at the sixth quarter, and decay to -0.04 percentage 
points in the long run. Figure 5-5 (f) shows that the exchange rate shocks have negative 
effects on the price level over time. The effects reach -0.25 percentage points in the long 
run. 
Figures 5-6 (a) to 5-6 (f) exhibit the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 5-6 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price appreciate the exchange rate 
over time. The effects reach 1. 7 percentage points at the fourth quarter and decay to zero 
in the long run. Figure 5-6 (b) shows that fiscal shocks have positive and mild effects on 
the exchange rate over time; the effects are from 0.05 to 0.45 percentage points during the 
time horizon. Figure 5-6 ( c) demonstrates that price (inflation) shocks depreciate the 
exchange rate by 0.2 percentage points at the first quarter; the effects reach 0.2 percentage 
points at the third quarter, and decrease to -0.45 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
5-6 (d) illustrates that the responses of the exchange rate to monetary innovations are 
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positive over time. The effects reach 0.6 percentage points at the first quarter, and 
increase to 3 percentage points in the medium and long run. Figure 5-6 ( e) shows that 
aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the exchange rate in the short- and 
medium- run, as economic theory postulated. The effects increase to 1.2 percentage 
points at the second quarter, and drop to -0.18 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
5-6 (f) shows that exchange rate shocks have positive effects on itself over time and the 
effects increase to 2.5 percentage points at the second quarter and decay to 1.5 percentage 
points in the long run. 
In summary, in the accumulated IRFs of output, the shocks of oil price decrease 
output in the long run. Fiscal innovations decrease the output over time. Price (inflation) 
innovations have cyclic and negative effects on output and the effects decay over time. 
Also notice that the VAR procedure is normalized on the GNP deflator, thus the IRFs 
show that the decrease of output is related with the increase in price level. Monetary 
shocks have positive effects on output over time. Aggregate demand shocks have 
positive effects on output only in the short run. The responses of output to exchange rate 
shocks are negative over time. 
In the accumulated IRFs of the price level, oil shocks do not increase the price 
level over the time periods, as one might expect. However, if the oil shocks are only 
temporary, and people do not have inflation expectations, then in this situation, temporary 
oil shocks might not increase the price level. Fiscal and monetary shocks have positive 
effects on the price level over time, as macroeconomic theory postulates. Fiscal and 
monetary shocks are not the important sources of the inflation in the short run, while their 
effects are increasing over time. Price (inflation) shocks have the most significant effects 
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on the price level among the six shocks, especially in the long run (from 0.6 to 1.2 
percentage points). Aggregate demand shocks have mild and positive effects on the price 
level in the medium run, and the effects decay in the long run. Exchange rate shocks 
decrease the price level over time. 
In the accumulative IR.Fs of the exchange rate, oil shocks appreciate the exchange 
rate over time. Against the case of the U.S., the impact of fiscal innovations on the 
exchange rate appears to appreciate Taiwan's currency over time. As macroeconomic 
theory postulates, this finding supports the popular notion of the Mundell-Flemming 
model, which proposes that increases in the budget deficit tend to appreciate the exchange 
rate; the conventional view holds because higher budget deficits lead to higher interest 
rates, and appreciate the exchange rate. Price shocks tend to depreciate Taiwan's 
currency during the time horizons, especially in the medium and long run. Against what 
one might expect, monetary shocks significantly appreciate Taiwan currency during the 
time horizons, especially in the long run. Aggregate demand and exchange rate shocks 
appreciate Taiwan's currency during the time horizon. 
5.2.3 The Choleski Model 
For comparison, we also perform the Choleski decomposition using the same six 
variables as those of the Karras model. The Choleski approach employs the VAR 
residuals to identify the unique lower triangular matrix R, solving the following equation 
into orthogonal shocks: 
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where I:z is the residual covariance matrix from the VAR equations, and I:v is the 
identified shocks from the Choleski decomposition. 
This statistical decomposition depends on the sequence in which variables are 
ordered in the VAR equations. The residual covariance matrix from a VAR ordered by 
oil price, deficit, GNP deflator, money aggregate, real GNP, and exchange rate yields a 
Choleski decomposition that is algebraically equivalent to estimating the following six 
equations by ordinary least squares: 
(5-1) 0 O z, =v, 
(5-2) 
(5-3) 
(5-4) 
(5-5) 
(5-6) 
The Choleski decomposition yields a system in whiche, = Rv,. Each shock, v,, is 
uncorrelated with the other shocks by construction. This system implies the 
contemporaneous restriction that the first variable responds to its own exogenous shock, 
the second variable responds to the first variable plus an exogenous shock to the second 
variable, and so on. 
The estimated parameters show the quantified relationship among the dependent 
variables in the selected structural equations. Table 5-2 (C) also shows the estimated 
coefficients for the Choleski model. The Choleski model estimates equations 5-1 to 5-6 
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for the M2 money aggregate. Many of the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant, such as oil price, deficit and GNP deflator variables in the money equation, 
and deficit and GNP deflator in the exchange rate equation. 
In general, the Choleski model has better R-square and adjusted R-square, but this 
model is less persuasive in the aggregate supply and monetary equations from a 
theoretical point of view. For example, in the aggregate supply equation, the price level 
is related to oil price and deficit, rather than the real GNP; and the sign of oil price is not 
what we expect. And in the money equation, money supply is related to international oil 
price instead of real GNP. Despite this inconsistency, the Choleski estimation shows that 
the signs of coefficients and its R-square are better than the original Karras model for the 
case of Taiwan. For example, aggregate demand has a positive response to the increase 
of the money aggregate. It also has an inverse relationship with the GNP deflator, as 
macroeconomic theory postulates. In the money supply equation, nominal M2 money 
tends to decrease in response to the rising GDP deflator. In the exchange rate equation, it 
shows that Taiwan's currency tends to depreciate when oil price, money supply and GNP 
deflator increase, and appreciate in response to rising real GNP and fiscal spending as one 
might expect. 
The Choleski model uses the lower diagonal matrix of contemporaneous 
equations to derive the IR.Fs and FEVDs from the VAR. Table 5-5 presents the variance 
decompositions for the six variables of interest. The numbers reported indicate the 
percentage of the forecasted errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the 
six structural innovations at different horizons. The percentages are reported for only 
four horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter ahead), the medium 
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run ( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). Also notice that the AS 
and AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and non-fiscal, non-
monetary aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
As in Karras' s setting, oil prices by construction are only affected by oil 
innovations. Therefore, it is modeled as a random walk with no feedback from the rest of 
the variables. Deficit is explained by its own variation. On the price level, oil price 
innovations account for about 24-33% variation on inflation in all time horizons. 
Aggregate supply shocks are more significant, about 66-51 % variation in all horizons. 
Monetary variation is dominated by aggregate demand shocks, about 64-50% during the 
periods; while oil price and deficit shocks are also important in the time horizon. 
Aggregate demand shocks also dominate all output variation at all horizons; oil shocks 
and aggregate supply shocks are gaining significance in the long run for real GNP; 
exchange rate shocks have little impact at all horizons. For the exchange rate, in the short 
run it is explained 65% by its own innovations, decreasing to 47% in the long run. Oil 
price and deficit shocks together account for the exchange rate innovations around 25-
30% during the 5-year time periods. Aggregate supply, demand and monetary shocks 
have little effect on the exchange rate in the time horizon. 
Impulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of each structural disturbance. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 5-7 to 5-9. Figures 5-7 (a) to 5-7 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IRFs of output (real GNP)to the six shocks. Figure 5-7 (a) shows that the 
shocks of oil price increase output by about 0.2 percentage points from the first to the 
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third quarters and the effects drop to -0.8 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-7 
(b) shows that fiscal innovations have a mixture of positive and negative effects on output 
in the short and medium run. The effects increase the output with 0.4 percentage points 
in the long run. Figure 5-7 ( c) shows that price (inflation) innovations decrease output 
over time; the effects decrease output by -0.35 percentage points on average. The 
responses of output to monetary innovations also are positive over time; the responses 
increase to 1.4 percentage points in the long run (Figure 5-7 (d)). Figure 5-7 (e) shows 
that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on output over time; the effects reach 
0.8 percentage points at the first quarter, and drop to 0.6 percentage points in the long 
run. Figure 5-7 (f) presents that the exchange rate shocks decrease output to -0.4 
percentage points at the sixth quarter. In the long run, the effects decay to -0.3 percentage 
points. 
Figures 5-8 (a) to 5-8 (f) demonstrate the price level responses with respect to the 
six shocks. Figure 5-8 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price decrease the price level by -
0.4 percentage points on average in the short- and long- run and the effects are -0.3 
percentage points on average in the medium run. Figure 5-8 (b) shows that fiscal shocks 
have positive effects on the price level over time. The effects increase to 0.58 percentage 
points in the long run. Price (inflation) shocks increase the price level over time (Figure 
5-8 (c)). The effects increase the price level from 0.6 percentage points at the first quarter 
to 1.2 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-8 ( d) shows that monetary innovations 
do not increase the price level until the eleventh quarter; however, the price level 
increases to 0.15 percentage points in the long run. Figure 5-8 (e) shows that aggregate 
demand shocks have a mixture of positive and negative effects on the price level over 
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time. Figure 5-8 (f) shows that the exchange rate shocks have negative effects on the 
price level over time. The effects reach -0.25 percentage points in the long run. 
Figures 5-9 (a) to 5-9 (f) exhibit the accumulative IR.Fs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 5-9 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price appreciate the exchange rate 
over time. The effects reach 1. 7 percentage points at the fourth quarter and decay to zero 
in the long run. Figure 5-9 (b) shows that fiscal shocks have positive effects on the 
exchange rate over time; the effects are from 1 to 2 percentage points during the time 
horizon. Figure 5-9 ( c) shows that price (inflation) shocks depreciate the exchange rate 
by -0.5 percentage points at the first quarter. The effects reach to -1.2 percentage points 
at the fifth·quarter as well as in the long run. Figure 5-9 (d) presents that the responses of 
the exchange rate to monetary innovations are positive except at the first and the second 
quarters. The shocks depreciate the exchange rate by -0.5 percentage points at the first 
quarter, but appreciate the exchange rate by 2 percentage points in the medium and long 
run. Figure 5-9 ( e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the 
exchange rate over time, as economic theory postulated. The effects increase to 1.4 
percentage points at the fourth quarter, and drop to 0.8 percentage points in the long run. 
Figure 5-9 (f) presents that exchange rate shocks have positive effects on itself over time 
and the effects increase to 2.5 percentage points at the second quarter and decay to 1.5 
percentage points in the long run. 
In summary, in the accumulated IR.Fs for output, the shocks of oil price decrease 
output in the long run. Fiscal innovations have a mixture of positive and negative effects 
on output in the short- and medium- run. Price (inflation) innovations have cyclic and 
negative effects on output. Also notice that the VAR procedure is normalized on the 
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GNP deflator, thus the IRFs show that the decrease of the output is related with the 
increase in price level. Monetary and aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on 
output over time. The responses of output to exchange rate shocks are negative over 
time. 
In the accumulated IRFs of the price level, oil shocks do not increase the price 
level over the time periods. However, if the oil shocks are only temporary, and people do 
not have the inflation expectation. In this situation, temporary oil shocks might not 
increase the price level. Fiscal shocks have positive effects on the price level over time, 
as macroeconomic theory postulates. Price (inflation) shocks have the most significant 
effects on the price level among the six shocks, especially in the long run (from 0.6 to 1.2 
percentage points). Monetary shocks are not the important sources of the inflation in the 
short run, while their effects are increasing over time. Aggregate demand shocks have a 
mixture of positive and negative effects on the price level over time. Exchange rate 
shocks decrease the price level over time. 
In the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate, oil shocks appreciate the exchange 
rate over time. Against the case of the U.S., the impact of fiscal innovations on the 
exchange rate appears to appreciate Taiwan's currency over time. As macroeconomic 
theory postulates, this finding supports the popular notion of the Mundell-Flemming 
model, which proposes that increases in the budget deficit tend to appreciate the exchange 
rate; the conventional view holds because higher budget deficits lead to higher interest 
rates, and appreciate the exchange rate. Price shocks tend to depreciate Taiwan's 
currency in the time horizons, especially in the medium- and long- run. Against one 
might expect monetary shocks significantly appreciate Taiwan currency during the time 
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horizons, especially in the long run. Aggregate demand and exchange rate shocks 
appreciate Taiwan's currency during the time horizon. 
5.2.4 Karras Versus Choleski Model 
For the restricted Karras model, it is surprising to find that the coefficients of the 
price and money variables in the contemporaneous exchange rate equation are rather large 
(i.e., -16.2 for price variable and -19.7 for money variable) for the case of Taiwan. One 
possible reason for this finding is that the size of the economy for Taiwan is rather small 
compared to the U.S. When a small economy experiences such significant shocks as 
those to the international oil price, the exchange rate and Asian Financial Crisis, the VAR 
residuals are more volatile. That is, if these highly volatile residuals were outliers in the 
VAR residuals, from a statistical point of view, the estimation of contemporaneous 
equation would reflect and convert this effect into its IR.Fs and forecasted error variance 
decompositions (FEVDs). Despite the drawbacks in the estimated parameters, however, 
most of the results in the restricted Karras model comply with most accepted 
macroeconomic theory. The comparisons for the quantified accumulated IR.Fs and 
FEVDs for the Karras and Choleski models are discussed as follows. 
( 1) In response to the oil shocks, macroeconomic theory postulates that this 
effect, if longer than one might expect, would increase the price level and 
decrease output. In all three models, the price levels are not increased and 
the output decreases mildly in the medium- and long- run. This indicates 
that if the oil price shocks are only temporary, in which case economic 
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agents have no expectation on inflation, the economy may be impacted only 
mildly. 
(2) Macroeconomic theory postulates that fiscal innovations shift the aggregate 
demand curve to the right, and this has positive effects on output and prices. 
This is shown in the restricted Karras and Choleski models in the price level; 
the two models show a mixture of positive and negative effects on the output 
in the short run. For the unrestricted Karras model, the output is not 
increased by the deficit shocks. From a theoretical point of view, output 
might not increase if there is a crowding out effect or if there is a fiscal 
budget constraint during the time horizon. 
(3) The Mundell-Flemming model proposes that increases in budget deficits 
tend to appreciate the exchange rate. We find that the fiscal innovations 
appear to appreciate the exchange rate for the three models. 
( 4) Keynesian theory proposes that inflation shocks would increase the expected 
inflation. This would decrease output (recessionary gap) and increase price 
level; with higher price level and lower output, the exchange rate tends to 
depreciate. This result is shown in each of the three models. 
( 5) According to theory, money shocks would decrease the interest rate, and 
output and price level would go up. The responses of the output and the 
price level to monetary innovations are found positive in the long run for the 
restricted Karras model. For Choleski and unrestricted Karras models, 
output is increased, but the price level has a mixture of positive and negative 
responses to the monetary shocks in the short- and medium- run. 
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( 6) Economic theory postulates that aggregate demand shocks would increase 
output and price level only in the short run. The restricted Karras and 
Choleski models show that the output increases over time and the price level 
decreases mildly. While in the unrestricted Karras model, demand shocks 
have only short-run effects on output and a mixed effects on the price level. 
(7) Positive nominal exchange rate shocks would decrease output because the 
increase of real exchange rate decrease the net export, which cause the 
decline in output and price level; in the Choleski and unrestricted models, 
the output and the price level decrease during the time horizons as the theory 
postulates. The restricted Karras model shows that the output and the price 
level decrease only in the short run. However, if the export can be expanded 
to the other foreign markets, the shift effect in net exports might outweigh 
the exchange rate shocks and thus output might not decrease in the long run. 
It is also interesting to find that the two Karras models show similar results for the 
accumulated impulse response functions to the six shocks except in the monetary and 
demand shocks. In the monetary shocks, the restricted Karras model shows that the 
exchange rate depreciates in response to monetary shocks, as one might expect, but the 
unrestricted model shows the opposite. The restricted model is more consistent than the 
unrestricted one from a theoretical point of view. In the demand shocks, however, the 
restricted Karras model shows the demand shock having a long-run effect on output, 
while the unrestricted Karras model shows only a temporary effect on output. The 
unrestricted model seems to have a more persuading result for demand shocks. 
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Comparing the Karras and Choleski models, the Choleski model is less persuasive 
in the contemporaneous estimation from a theoretical point of view; for example, in the 
Choleski model, the aggregate supply equation shows that supply would respond to oil 
price and deficit rather than oil price and price level; and in the monetary equation, 
money supply would be affected by the international oil price rather than output, and this 
is a contradiction to generally accepted economic theory. 
In addition, the Choleski model shows less desired results in the accumulated 
IR.Fs. For example, the Choleski model shows that money shocks also have no effect or 
little effect in the long run on the change of inflation. In addition, it shows monetary 
shocks appreciating Taiwan currency over time ( except in the short run). This finding is 
against macroeconomic theory, which postulates that an increase in money supply would 
decrease the real interest rate and then depreciate the exchange rate. 
5.3 The Identified Structural Shocks 
The structural VAR also allows us to examine whether the identified structural 
shocks over time are appropriate. By the comparison of these three models in the 
accumulated IR.Fs and FEVDs, we find that the restricted Karras model is better than the 
other two decompositions. We also compare the structural shocks of the three estimated 
models with the actual fluctuations of economic variables to see whether the 
decomposition is appropriate or not. The identified structural shocks may help to explain 
the fluctuations of economic variables of interest during the sampling period (1981 :1 to 
2000:4). Positive shocks indicate actual figures of economic variables of interest are 
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higher than expectation and negative shocks are otherwise lower. Figures 5-10 (a) to 5-
10 (f) present the identified six structural shocks from 83:2 to 2000:4. 
The international oil price reached its peak at $39 per barrel in 1981 during the 
second oil crisis; it decreased to $28 per barrel by 1985; then dropped to $13 in1986. The 
oil price was around $15 - $20 during 1987-1989. In 1990, the international oil price 
soared to $31 due to the Gulf war, then dropped to the $20s over the following 8 years 
until year 2000 in which it again reached $30 per barrel. Corresponding to the oil price 
fluctuations, we identified significant spikes of structural oil price shocks 1986: 1 
(negative), 1987:l(positive), 1988:3 (negative), 1989:1 (positive), 1990:2 (negative) and 
1990:3 (positive), 1998:1 (negative) and 1999:2 (positive). The structural oil price 
shocks represent actual fluctuations of the international oil prices, which are higher 
(positive) or lower (negative) than one might expect. For fiscal policy, the deficit 
dramatically increased in 1989:2. The government deficit increased every year since 
1990. As one might expect, the identified positive spike of the structural deficit shocks 
corresponds to the dramatic increase of deficit in 1989:2. 
Taiwan's price level soared in the 1981-1982 period due to the second oil crisis, 
and remained flat during the 1986:1-1988:3 periods then soared in 1988:4-1998 except in 
1997: 1. The price level adjusted up in 1990:3 during the Gulf War periods due to the 
high oil price. In the 1993-2000 periods, the price level climbed with a spike in1996:3 
and 1997:4 and decreased after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998:2-1999:2 periods with 
a trough in 1998:4. These events are identified in the structural shocks 
For the monetary side, generally speaking, the supply ofM2 steadily increased 
during the sample period. Since the money supply is influenced principally by the 
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Central Bank, we find that most of the identified structural monetary shocks are positive 
from 1984:3 to 1986:2 when Taiwan's economy experienced a recession, and during 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. We also find highly volatile shocks during the Gulf War 
in 1991. This finding might indicate that the Central Bank tried to control the money 
supply over time in responding to the significant economic events in order to reach its 
economic goals. This finding is not captured in the impulse response functions. 
For output, Taiwan's economy experienced economic growth annually in the past 
forty years. Taiwan's economy experienced higher economic growth rate during the 
1989-1990, 1994-1995 and 1997-2000 periods. A proportion of the economic expansion 
in 1998-1990 is due to the depreciation of Taiwan's currency during the periods. Due to 
the depreciation of Taiwan's currency and the boom of the computer industry during 
1996-2000, the economy was not badly harmed by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
The identified structural shocks correspond to the similar results as above. This finding 
supports the view that the flexible exchange rate regime is more helpful in protecting the 
export-oriented country from international shocks. The economy experienced dramatic 
growth in 2000:2 due to the heyday of information technology (IT) industry. The 
identified structural shocks show significant negative shocks in 1983:2, 1984:3,1985:4, 
1986:4, 1988:2 and 1991:1-2. These shocks correspond to the fact that the economy 
slowed during1981-1985 and 1991 periods due to the second oil crisis in 1980 and due to 
the Gulf War in 1991. 
For exchange rate, Taiwan's currency appreciated during 1984 then experienced 
significant depreciation in 1985 :2-1987: 1. The exchange rate appreciates dramatically 
during 1987:2-1994 with the peak during 1989. Taiwan's currency also depreciated due 
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to the Gulf War in 1990 and the Asian Financial Crisis since 1997:4. Corresponding to 
the actual fluctuations, the identified structural shocks of exchange rate are found positive 
during 1983:2-1985:1 then tum down during 1985:2-1986:2. We also find negative 
spikes during 1989:4-1990:3 as well as in 1997:4. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE CASE OF JAPAN 
Karras's methodology with the six variables is also employed to analyze Japan's 
macroeconomic fluctuations. In this model, Yis the logarithm of real GNI;fis the ratio 
of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt subtracted from one. 
We use this manipulation because some of the seasonally adjusted budget deficits are still 
positive; in this case the log level of the fiscal variable is not well defined. Pis the 
logarithm of the GDP price deflator. E denotes the logarithm of the nominal exchange 
rate, SDRs per Japanese Yen. 0 is the logarithm of the oil price deflated by P. As in the 
U.S. case, model selection criteria are employed to compare many alternative 
contemporaneous models, which are used to identify the most appropriate impulse 
response functions and variance decomposition functions. 
6.1 Data and Implementation 
The estimation period for Japan is quarterly data from 1983 :2 to 2001 :2. Data for 
Y, P, E and oil prices are derived from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund· (IMF). Government deficit and debt are obtained from the 
Bank of Japan. The logarithms of two different monetary aggregates are tried for M: Ml, 
and M2 (Quasi Money). Money data are also derived from IMF's International Financial 
Statistics. 
The VAR procedure requires the data series of interest to be stationary. The 
Dickey-Fuller's Zandt test as well as Dickey-Fuller's joint test of unit root are used to 
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examine stationarity of all variables. Table 6-1 presents the results of Augumented 
Dickey-Fuller's test on the log levels of the variables. The results find that the first 
differences of 0, f, E, P, Y, M2 and M2/P are stationary. 
Based on Karras's model, the VAR was estimated in first differences of the log 
levels of 0, f, P, Y, E and M2, with the oil price restricted as a random variable. Several 
alternative specifications for the lag structure and determinants were tested. Based on 
tests of the lag structure and equation determinants, the VAR model with a constant and 
four lags was adopted. 
After the VAR is estimated and the reduced-form residuals are obtained, 
estimation of contemporaneous equations as in 4-6 to 4-11 occurs to recover the 
structural shocks. The same criteria are used as in the U.S. case to select the appropriate 
model for Japan. The following estimation of the simultaneous equations employs two-
stage least squares (2SLS), as employed in the restricted Karras model to recover the six 
structural shocks, which are used to generate the impulse response and variance 
decomposition functions. 
1. Oil price is restricted as a random variable. 
2. Deficit is also restricted as random variable so that z{ =z?. 
3. Use 0 1 and i{ as instrument variables for equation (4-8) to calculate 
4. Use o,, i{ and z{ as instrument variables for equation (4-10) to calculate 
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5. Use o" i(, l{ and u; as instrument variables for equation (4-9) to run regression to 
6. Use o,, i(, l{, u;' and u; as instrument variables for equation (4-11) to calculate 
The estimated parameters show the quantified relationships among the dependent 
variables in the selected structural equations. Table 6-2 presents the estimated 
contemporaneous model for the M2 money aggregate. Some of the estimated coefficients 
are significant, such as the deficit and exchange rate in the money equation, and deficit in 
the exchange rate equation, but the others are less significant. 
In this restricted model, most signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent 
with macroeconomic theory, except in the aggregate supply equation. Estimation of 
aggregate supply shows a positive relationship with respect to international oil price and 
negative response to price level. The signs of the coefficients on price level do not 
change regardless of what variables are included to accompany the GDP deflator. In the 
money equation, the M2 money aggregate is positive with respect to the increase of 
deficit, output, and exchange rate and is negative in response to the price level, as one 
might expect. In the aggregate demand equation, aggregate demand decreases in response 
to the increase of oil price, deficit, and real money supply. In the exchange rate equation, 
the Japanese Yen depreciates with respect to the increase of fiscal spending, price level 
and output; nonetheless the Yen appreciates with respect to the increase of oil price, and 
M2 money. The statistics show that these coefficients are not significant. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, the inconsistency in the signs of estimated coefficients may reflect on the 
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real economic situation during the sample period. As one might expect, we find that 
these signs change over different sample periods. 
Once the coefficients of matrix A are estimated, we can identify the structural 
shocks and their dynamic innovations of the variables of interest through variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions. As long as the system's covariance 
matrix is diagonal or all structural equations are identified, the relative efficiency of each 
alternative will be the same. The identification of contemporaneous equation is used to 
convert the correlated VAR residuals into structural innovations, which is demonstrated 
as in equation (4-12) 
In detailed expression for the restricted Karras model: 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 a2 0 aod aop aom aoy (Yoe 
0 1 0 0 0 0 ado a2 d adp adm (J' dy ade 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 apo apd a2 p apm (J' PY (J' pe 
0 a4 as 1 a6 a1 amo amd (J' mp a2 m (J' my ame 
as a9 0 a10 1 0 (J' yo ayd aYP (J'ym (]'2 y aye 
a11 a12 a13 a14 a1s 1 (Yeo aed (Yep (Yem (J'ey a2 e 
0 D p M y E 0 D p M y E 
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 uo 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 f 0 0 0 0 
a2 0 a3 0 1 0 0 0 u2 p 0 0 0 
0 a4 as 1 a6 a1 0 0 0 
2 
um 0 0 
as a9 0 a10 1 0 0 0 0 0 u2 y 0 
a11 a12 a13 a14 a1s 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 
ue 
88 
Equation ( 4-12) can be used to identify structural shocks ( u 0 , uf, uys, um, uyd, ue ). 
With all the structural shocks recovered, we can proceed to calculate impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition functions as shown in Chapter 2. Notice that in the 
VAR procedure, it is normalized on the price level. Thus, the accumulated IRFs of the 
price level, M2, RGNP, and exchange rate show their relationship to the price (inflation) 
shock. The following empirical findings will be based on the restricted Karras model 
with the M2 aggregate. 
6.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Significant economic events during the sample period may have a profound 
impact on the economic variables of interest. It is important to notice what the economy 
had experienced from 1983 to 2001 for Japan. Among those economic events, two 
important events during the sample period had impacted the Japanese economy. First, the 
bubble of the Japanese economy busts since 1992. The price level continues going down, 
and the economy was stagnant for almost ten years. Second, the financial crisis ( capital 
exodus) in Asian countries since 1998 impacted heavily the Japanese economy. This 
event not only caused the dramatic depreciation of the Japanese Yen but almost every 
currency of Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Korea etc.). 
Also, international capital investment to Mainland China increased since 1998 for its 
cheaper wage rate and its market opportunity. This substitution effect causes the decrease 
of investment in Japan, and the rise of the unemployment rate as well. On the other hand, 
government's ability to control policy variables such as fiscal expense, money supply, and 
the exchange rate may also impact the estimation of contemporaneous equations. All 
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these impacts will be quantified on average into the following variance decompositions 
and impulse response functions. 
Table 6-3 presents the variance decompositions and mean squared errors for the 
six variables of interest. The numbers reported indicate the percentage of the forecasted 
errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the structural innovations at 
different horizons. Similar to Karras (1993), the percentages are reported for only four 
horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter ahead), the medium run 
( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). Also notice that the AS and 
AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and non-fiscal, non-monetary 
aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
As in Karras's methodology, the oil prices by construction are only affected by 
their own innovations. They are modeled as a random walk with no feedback from the 
rest of the variables. Fiscal variation is explained primarily by its own variation. On the 
price level, as macroeconomic theory postulates, aggregate supply innovations account 
for about from 85% to 45% variation of inflation over all horizons, while monetary and 
oil price shocks become more significant in the medium and long run. This finding 
supports the view that Japan's economy is more sensitive to oil price fluctuations than the 
U.S. economy, as one might expect. Aggregate demand shocks and monetary shocks 
dominate all output variation decomposition but are decreasing from 37-16% and 35-19% 
respectively in all horizons; whereas oil and aggregate supply shocks are getting 
significant in the medium, and long run on output. 
For the exchange rate, in the short run it is explained 65% by its own innovations, 
decreasing to 32% in the five-year horizon. Aggregate supply shocks account for the 
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exchange rate innovations around 14% during the 5-year time periods. Oil price, deficit 
and monetary shocks have a trivial effect on the exchange rate in the short-run, but they 
account for about 17%, 14% and 13% respectively in the medium- and long-run. 
hnpulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of each structural disturbance. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of the output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 6-1 to 6-3. Figures 6-1 (a) to 6-1 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IR.Fs of output (real GNP) to the six shocks. Figure 6-1 (a) shows that the 
shocks of oil price increase output by about 0.2 percentage points in the short- and 
medium- run and the effects drop to -0.8 percentage points in the long run. Figure 6-1 (b) 
shows that fiscal innovations have negative effects on output over time; the effects 
decrease output by-0.13 percentage points at first quarter and reach -0.4 percentage 
points in the long run. Figure 6-1 ( c) shows that price (inflation) innovations increase 
output over time; the effects reach 1 percentage point in the long run. The responses of 
output to monetary innovations also are positive over time; the responses increase to 0.7 
percentage points in the long run (Figure 6-1 (d)). Figure 6-1 (e) shows that aggregate 
demand shocks have positive effects on output over time, as economic theory postulated; 
the effects reach 0.3 percentage points in the medium run, but drop to 0.04 percentage 
points in the long run. Figure 6-1 (f) shows that the exchange rate shocks decrease output 
over time. In the long run, the effects reach -0.45 percentage points. 
Figures 6-2 (a) to 6-2 (f) demonstrate the price level responses with respect to the 
six shocks. Figure 6-2 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price decrease the price level over 
time. The effects reach 2 percentage points in the long run. Figure 6-2 (b) shows that 
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fiscal shocks have positive effects on price level only at the first and the second quarters. 
The effects reach -0.2 percentage points in the long run. Price (inflation) shocks increase 
the price level over time (Figure 6-2 (c)). The effects increase price level from 0.6 
percentage points at the first quarter to 1.6 perceqtage points in the long run. Figure 6-2 
( d) presents that monetary innovations do not increase the price level until the third 
quarter; however, the price level increases to 0.5 percentage points in the long run. 
Figure 6-2 ( e) shows that aggregate demand shocks decrease the price level over time. 
The effects reach-0.8 percentage points in the long run. Figure 6-2 (f) shows that the 
exchange rate shocks have negative effects on the price level over time. The effects reach 
-0.5 percentage points in the long run. 
Figures 6-3 (a) to 6-3 (f) exhibit the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 6-3 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price depreciate the exchange rate 
over time. The effects reach the peak at -2.4 percentage points at the seventh quarter and 
decay to -1.5 percentage points in the long run. Figure 6-3 (b) shows that fiscal shocks 
have negative effects on the exchange rate over time; the effects reach -0.8 percentage 
points in the long run. Figure 6-3 (c) shows that price (inflation) shocks depreciate the 
exchange rate by 1 percentage point at the first quarter. The effects reach -1.6 percentage 
points at the seventh quarter, and decrease to -0.2 percentage points in the long run. 
Figure 6-3 (d) shows that the responses of the exchange rate to monetary innovations are 
positive and volatile over time. The effects reach 0.8 percentage points at the first 
quarter, and increase to 1 percentage point in the medium- and long- run. Figure 6-3 (e) 
shows that aggregate demand shocks have negative effects on the exchange rate in the 
short- and medium-run. The effects reach -1 percentage point at the third quarter, and 
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decay in the long run. Figure 6-3 (f) illustrates that exchange rate shocks have positive 
effects on the exchange rate over time and the effects increase to 3 percentage points in 
the long run. 
In summary, the shocks of oil price decrease output only in the long run, with a 
mild effect. Surprisingly, fiscal innovations cannot increase output during the time 
horizons; this could happen ifthere is a crowding out effect or there is a fiscal budget 
constraint during the time horizon. The exchange rate shocks decrease output during the 
time horizons as one might expect. Price (inflation) innovations have mild effects on 
output in the short run, but surprisingly output increases in the long run. Aggregate 
demand shocks have only short-term effects on output as macroeconomic theory 
postulates; but the responses of output to monetary innovations are positive and 
increasing over time. 
For the accumulated IRFs of the price level to the six shocks, oil and fiscal shocks 
increase price level only in the short run. Price (inflation) shocks have more significant 
effect on the price level, especially in the long run while aggregate demand has a mild and 
positive effect on output only in the short run. As expected, money shocks are important 
in causing inflation in the long run. The price level has little response to the exchange 
rate shocks over all time horizons. 
For the accumulated IRFs of the exchange rate to the six shocks, same as the U.S. 
result, the impact of fiscal innovations on the exchange rate appears to depreciate the 
Japaness currency over time. Price (inflation) shocks tend to depreciate the Japanese 
currency in the time horizons as one might expect. Aggregate demand appreciates the 
Yen only in the long run. Surprising, monetary shocks do not depreciate Japan's 
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currency. Macroeconomic theory postulates that excess in money supply would cause 
inflation, and decrease the real interest rate, thus depreciating the exchange rate. 
However, if the money shocks have a money illusion effect and the additional money is 
used to finance domestic investment for continued economic expansion, the exchange 
rate might not depreciate due to money shocks. 
It is also interesting to notice that international oil price shocks seem to have little 
impact on the price level and output but have larger impact on the exchange rate in the 
short run, as shown in the case of Taiwan. Fiscal shocks have significantly greater impact 
on the exchange rate than output over time. Price (negative supply) shocks have 
increasing impact on output in the long run; the exchange rate is more sensitive to the 
supply shocks; and surprisingly output is not decreased by the supply shocks as one might 
expect; this phenomena might be due to the oversea investment which decreased 
manufacturing costs during 1980s and 1990s. 
Monetary shocks have a mild effect on the price level, output, and the exchange 
rate. Demand shocks have hump-shape effects on output as one might expect, and the 
exchange rate is sensitive to the shocks especially in the short run. Exchange shocks have 
only mild effects on output and price level, but have a dominant effect on itself over time. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CASE OF KOREA 
The case of Korea follows Karras's methodology with the six variables. In this 
model, Yis the logarithm of real GNI and/is the ratio of the logarithm of the real 
government deficit to government debt subtracted from one. We use this manipulation 
because some of the seasonally adjusted budget deficits are still positive; in this case the 
log level of the fiscal variable is not well defined. Pis the logarithm of the GDP price 
deflator. E denotes the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate- SDRs per South 
Korea's Won. 0 is the logarithm of the oil price deflated by P. As in the U.S. case, the 
model selection criteria are employed to compare many alternative contemporaneous 
models. Then, the selected model is used to identify the most appropriate impulse 
response functions and variance decomposition functions. 
7.1 Data and Implementation 
The estimation period for Korea is quarterly data from 1980: 1 to 2000:2. Data for 
Y, P, E and Oil price data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund. These data 
are derived from IMF's International Financial Statistics. The logarithms of two different 
monetary aggregates are tried for M: Ml, and M2 (Quasi Money). Money data are also 
derived from IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
The VAR procedure requires the data series of interest to be stationary. The 
Dickey-Fuller's Zandt test as well as Dickey-Fuller's joint test of unit root are used to 
examine the stationarity of all the variables. Table 7-1 presents the results of 
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Augumented Dickey-Fuller's test on the log levels of the variables. The results find that 
the first difference of 0, f, E, P, Y, M2, and M2/P are stationary. 
Based on Karras's results, a VAR was estimated in first differences of the log 
levels of 0, f, P, Y, E, and M2, with the oil price restricted as a random variable. Several 
alternative specifications for the lag structure and determinants were tested. Based on 
tests of lag structure and equation determinants, the VAR model with a constant and four 
lags is adopted. 
After the VAR is estimated and the reduced-form residuals are obtained, 
estimation of contemporaneous equations as in 4-6 to 4-11 occurs to recover the 
structural shocks. The same criteria are used as in the U.S. case to select the appropriate 
model for Korea. The following estimation of the simultaneous equations employs two-
stage least squares (2SLS), as employed in the restricted Karras model to recover the six 
structural shocks, which are used to generate the impulse response and variance 
decomposition functions. 
1. Oil price is restricted as a random variable. 
2. Deficit is also restricted as random variable so that z{ =t(. 
3. Use 0 1 and i( as instrument variables for equation (4-8) to calculate 
4. Use o" i( and 14 as instrument variables for equation (4-10) to calculate 
5. Use 0 1 , i(, l{ and u1 as instrument variables for equation (4-9) to run regression to 
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6. Use o 1 , ,{, l{, u; and u 1 as instrument variables for equation ( 4-11) to calculate 
The estimated parameters show the quantified relationships among the dependent 
variables in the selected structural equations. Table 7-2 presents the estimated 
coefficients from the restricted Karras model for the M2 money aggregate. Some of the 
estimated coefficients are significant such as real GNI and the GDP deflator in the 
monetary equation; and oil price, GDP deflator, and money variables in the exchange rate 
equation. 
In the restricted model, most signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent 
with macroeconomic theory. The aggregate supply has a positive relationship with 
respect to price level but its response to oil price is also positive. In the money equation, 
money supply has an inverse relation to the increase of real GNI, GDP deflator and deficit 
and is increased in response to exchange rate appreciation. In the aggregate demand 
equation, aggregate demand decreases when the price level and international oil prices 
increase. Aggregate demand also increases in response to the real money supply, but the 
coefficient appears to be rather large. In the exchange rate equation, the Korean Won_has 
a negative relation to the oil price, GDP deflator, money supply and real GNI. Only when 
fiscal expense increases, the Korean Won tends to appreciate. As mentioned in Chapter 
5, the inconsistency in the signs of estimated coefficients may reflect on the real 
economic situation during the sample period. As one might expect, we find that these 
signs change over different sample periods. 
Once the coefficients of matrix A are estimated, we can identify the structural 
shocks and the dynamic innovations of these variables of interest through variance 
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decomposition and impulse response functions. As long as the system's covariance 
matrix is diagonal or all structural equations are identified, the relative efficiency of each 
alternative will be the same. The identification of the contemporaneous equation is used 
to convert the correlated VAR residuals into structural innovations which is demonstrated 
in equation (4-12) 
A'I.zA' = Lu. 
In detailed expression for the restricted Karras model: 
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Equation (4-12) can be used to identify structural shocks (u 0 , uf, uys, um, uyd, ue). 
With all the structural shocks recovered, we can proceed to calculate impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition functions as shown in Chapter 2. Notice that the 
VAR procedure is normalized on the price level. Thus, the accumulated IR.Fs of the price 
level, M2, RGNP, and the exchange rate show their relationship to the price (inflation) 
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shock. The following empirical findings will be based on the restricted Karras model 
with the M2 aggregate. 
7.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Since significant economic events during the sample period may have profound 
impacts on the economic variables of interest for the Korean economy, it is important to 
note what the economy had experienced from 1980 to 2000. Two important events 
during the sample period had severe impacts on Korea's economy. First, the second 
world oil crisis of 1979 severely impacted Korea's economy. The crisis may cause a 
higher price level and decrease real GNI during the following two years in Korea. 
Second, the financial crisis (capital exodus) in Asian countries since 1998 impacted the 
Korean economy severely. The Korean currency deeply depreciated due to the 
tremendous foreign debt. This event not only caused the dramatic depreciation of the 
Korean Won but almost every currency of Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan etc.). In addition, since 1998 international investment 
capital moved to Mainland China for the cheaper labor rate and domestic market 
opportunity; this substitution effect might cause the decrease of investment in Korea, and 
the rise of unemployment rate as well. On the other hand, government ability to control 
the policy variables such as fiscal expenses, money supply, and exchange rate may impact 
the estimates of the contemporaneous equations. All these impacts will be quantified on 
average into the variance decompositions and impulse response functions. 
Table 7-3 presents the variance decompositions and mean squared errors for the 
six variables of interest. The numbers reported indicate the percentage of the forecasted 
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errors in each variable that can be attributed to each of the structural innovations at 
different horizons. Similar to Karras's article (1993), the percentages are reported for 
only four horizons, which will be interpreted as the short run ( one quarter ahead), the 
medium run ( 4 or 8 quarters ahead), and the long run (20 quarters ahead). Also notice 
that the AS and AD shocks that follow represent non-oil aggregate supply and non-fiscal, 
non-monetary aggregate demand shocks for convenience. 
Oil price by construction is only affected by its own innovations. It is modeled as 
a random walk with no feedback from the rest of the variables. Fiscal variation is 
explained by its own variation, 90-75%. On the price level, as macroeconomic theory 
postulates, aggregate supply innovations account for about 60% to 42% variation for all 
horizons; while the exchange rate and oil price shocks are also significant over the time 
horizons. This finding also indicates that the Korean economy is sensitive to oil price 
fluctuations. Monetary variation is explained by its own shocks. Monetary shocks also 
dominate the output variance decomposition in all horizons. 
For the exchange rate, in the short run it is explained 70% by its own innovations, 
decreasing to 54% in the five-year horizon. Aggregate demand and oil price shocks 
account for the exchange rate innovations around 13% and 17% in the medium and long 
run. 
Impulse response functions present the responses of variables over time to 
innovations of the structural disturbances. The accumulated impulse response functions 
of output, the price level, and the exchange rate to one standard deviation of the six 
shocks are shown in Figures 7-1 to 7-3. Figures 7-1 (a) to 7-1 (f) demonstrate 
accumulated IR.Fs of output (real GNP) to the six shocks. Figure 7-1 (a) shows that the 
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shocks of oil price have a mixture of positive and negative effects on output in the short 
run, and the effects have -3 percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-1 (b) shows that 
fiscal innovations have negative effects on output over time except at the second quarter. 
The effects decrease the output at -1 percentage point in the long run. Figure 7-1 (c) 
shows that price (inflation) innovations decrease output in the short and medium run; the 
effects reach 1.5 percentage points in the long run. The responses of output to monetary 
innovations are positive over time; the responses reach 25 percentage points at the first 
quarter and drop to 5 percentage points in the long run (Figure 7-1 (d)). Figure 7-1 (e) 
shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on output over time, as 
economic theory postulates; the effects reach 10 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
7-1 (f) illustrates that the exchange rate shocks increase output over time. In the long run, 
the effects reach 7 percentage points. 
Figures 7-2 (a) to 7-2 (f) demonstrate the price level responses with respect to the 
six shocks. Figure 7-2 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price decrease the price level over 
time. The effects reach 2.5 percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-2 (b) shows that 
fiscal shocks have positive effects on price level over time. The effects reach 1.2 
percentage points in the long run. Price (inflation) shocks increase the price level over 
time (Figure 7-2 (c)). The effects increase the price level from 1.3 percentage points at 
the first quarter to 1.1 percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-2 ( d) shows that 
monetary innovations decrease the price level over time; the price level decreases to -0.5 
percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-2 (e) shows that aggregate demand shocks 
decrease the price level over time except in the short run. The effects reach -1 percentage 
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point in the long run. Figure 7-2 (f) shows.that the exchange rate shocks have positive 
effects on the price level over time. The effects reach 1 percentage point in the long run. 
Figures 7-3 (a) to 7-3 (f) exhibit the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the 
six shocks. Figure 7-3 (a) shows that the shocks of oil price depreciate the exchange rate 
over time. The effects reach the peak at -5.5 percentage points at the seventh quarter and 
decay to -5 percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-3 (b) shows that fiscal shocks 
have positive effects on the exchange rate over time; the effects reach 3 percentage points 
in the long run. Figure 7-3 (c) illustrates that price (inflation) shocks depreciate the 
exchange rate over time. The effects reach -1.8 percentage points in the long run. Figure 
7-3 (d) shows that the responses of the exchange rate to monetary innovations are 
negative over time. The effects are from -1.5 to -2 percentage points over the time 
horizon. Figure 7-3 (e) shows that aggregate demand shocks have positive effects on the 
exchange rate only in the short run; the shocks have negative effects in the medium and 
long run. The effects reach 2.2 percentage points at the first quarter, then reach -0.5 
percentage points in the long run. Figure 7-3 (f) shows that exchange rate shocks have 
positive effects on the exchange rate over time and the effects have 5.5 percentage points 
in the medium and long run. 
In summary, for the accumulated impulse response functions of output (real GNI) 
to the six shocks, the shocks of oil price mildly decrease output only in the long run. 
Fiscal innovations increase output only in the short run. In the long run, the effects 
become negative; this could happen if there is a crowding out effect or if there is a fiscal 
budget constraint during the time horizon. The exchange rate shocks decrease output 
during the time horizons as one might expect. Price (inflation) innovations decrease 
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output in the short run, but surprisingly the output increases in the long run. Aggregate 
demand shocks not onlyhave short-term but also long-run effects on output. The 
responses of output to monetary innovations are increased significantly in the first quarter 
but decreased after the second quarter. 
For the accumulated IRFs of the price level to the six shocks, surprisingly; oil 
shocks do not inflate the price level during the time period, while fiscal shocks increase 
the price level over the periods. Price (inflation) shocks have positive effects on the price 
level, especially in the short run, while money shocks do not inflate the price level during 
the sampling period. Aggregate demand has mild and positive effects on the price level 
only in the short run. The price level responds highly to the exchange rate shocks over all 
time horizons. 
For the accumulative IRFs of the exchange rate to the six shocks, oil shocks tend 
to depreciate the Korean Won. As in the U.S. result, the impact of fiscal innovations on 
the exchange rate appears to depreciate the Korean currency over time. Price (inflation) 
shocks tend to depreciate the Korean currency over the time horizons. Monetary shocks 
depreciate the Korean currency during the time horizons. Aggregate demand appreciates 
the Won only in the short run. Exchange rate shocks have positive effects on Korea's 
currency. 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Summary 
Structural V ARs are different from traditional V ARs in that the former employs 
macroeconomic theories as restrictions to derive the impulse response and variance 
decomposition functions. The structural VAR method estimates parameters by imposing 
contemporaneous and/or long run structural restrictions. The estimation of these 
contemporaneous equations and/or long run structural restrictions is consistent with 
macroeconomic theories and is used to transform reduced-form residuals into structural 
innovation. This paper employs the restricted version of Karras (1993) model and uses 
generally accepted macroeconomic theories to investigate the importance of six different 
kinds of structural shocks for the macroeconomic fluctuations for the U.S. from 1973 to 
2001, Taiwan from 1981 to 2000, Japan from 1983 to 2001 as well as Korea from1980 to 
2000. The six structural innovations postulated were: oil, fiscal, price, (non-oil) 
aggregate supply, monetary, (non-fiscal, non-monetary) aggregate demand, and exchange 
rate disturbances. Many alternative contemporaneous restrictions have been tried to 
identify the more appropriate result. 
It is interesting to find that the estimated coefficients of price and money variables 
in the exchange rate contemporaneous equation are rather large for the case of Taiwan; 
and this is also shown in the coefficient of the real money variable in the aggregate 
demand equation in the case of Korea. But the problems are not shown in the cases of the 
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United States and Japan. One possible reason for this finding is that the size of economy 
for Taiwan and Korea are rather small compared to the U.S. The residuals from V ARs 
might become more volatile when a small economy experiences such significant shocks 
as those to the international oil price, the exchange rate and the Asian Financial Crisis. 
That is, if some of the VAR residuals are found unusual or highly volatile (these 
observations are outliers from a statistical point of view), the estimation of 
contemporaneous equations would reflect and convert these effects into the IRFs and 
FEVDs. Thus, even though the same restricted Karras model are used to derive the IRFs 
and FEVDs for the four countries, some of the IRFs and FEVDs for these countries might 
be inconsistent each other. These inconsistencies might be the case because each country 
has its own economic experience, characteristics and ingredients. Despite these 
drawbacks, however, most of the results do have consistencies and comply with most 
accepted macroeconomic theories. Based on the restricted Karras model, the 
comparisons for the quantified accumulated IRFs and FEVDs for these countries are 
discussed as follows: 
1. Forecasted error variance decomposition 
(1) Fiscal variation is dominated by its own shocks for the U.S., Taiwan, Japan, and 
Korea. 
(2) On the variation of the price level, the U.S. economy shows that aggregate 
supply and M2 money shocks are more significant. For Japan, aggregate supply 
and oil price shocks are more important. For Korea, aggregate supply, exchange 
rate and oil price shocks are significant; and for Taiwan, the variation is 
explained mainly by aggregate supply, followed by oil price variables. 
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(3) Aggregate demand explains about 87-68% for the variation ofM2 money in all 
horizons for the U.S.; for Japan, monetary, oil price and aggregate demand 
shocks are more important for the variation. In Korea, monetary shocks are the 
primary factor; and for Taiwan, monetary variation is explained by its own, 
followed by exchange rate, oil price and fiscal shocks. 
(4) For output, the results show that monetary and aggregate supply shocks dominate 
the variation during the horizons in the U.S. economy. But in Japan, monetary 
policy is the main source for output variation, followed by aggregate demand and 
oil price shocks. In Korea, monetary policy is found to be the primary source of 
output variation. Whereas in Taiwan, output variation is shared by aggregate 
demand and the exchange rate, followed by aggregate supply shocks. 
(5) The exchange rate is primarily explained byits own innovations in the U.S., over 
80% in all horizons. In Japan, the variation is explained by its own for 65-32%, 
followed by monetary, oil price and aggregate supply shocks, which are equally 
important. In Korea, the exchange rate accounts for 70-54% of its variation. Oil 
price and aggregate demand shocks are also important after midterm. In Taiwan, 
the exchange rate is found to be less important to its own variation. Instead, 
monetary shocks are the most important source for the variation, followed by 
deficit shocks. 
2. Accumulated impulse response functions: 
(1) In response to the oil shocks, macroeconomic theory postulate that this effect, if 
longer than one might expect, would increase price level and decrease output . 
For the U.S., the price level goes up and real GNP decreases as one expect. For 
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Japan, international oil price shocks do not increase the price level except at the 
first quarter; the shocks decrease output only in the long run. For Taiwan, the oil 
shocks decrease output in the medium and long run and mildly decrease the price 
level over time. For Korea, the oil shocks decrease output in the long run and 
decrease the price level over time. 
(2) Keynesian theory postulates that fiscal innovations shift the aggregate demand 
curve to the right, and this might have positive effects on output and price level. 
This is shown in the United States. For Taiwan, the shocks have a mixture of 
positive and negative effects on the output in the short run and positive effects on 
the price level over time. For Japan, the price level positively responds to the 
fiscal shocks only for the very short run, but the output are negative over time. 
In Korea, fiscal shocks increase the price level; the effects increase output only at 
the second quarter. Notice that ifthere is a crowding out effect or ifthere is a 
fiscal budget constraint during the time horizon, output might become negative 
to the fiscal shocks. 
(3) The Mundell-Flemming model proposes that increases in budget deficit tend to 
appreciate the exchange rate. We find fiscal innovation appears to appreciate the 
exchange rate for Taiwan and Korea, but not the U.S. and Japan. However, as 
Karras (1993) indicated, if the budget deficits are monetized or if budget deficits 
have no effect on the interest rate (Ricardian Equivalence holds), the exchange 
rate will not be appreciated by the fiscal shocks. 
( 4) Keynesian theory proposed that price (inflation) shocks would increase the 
expected inflation. This would decrease output (recessionary gap) and increase 
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the price level; and with the higher price level and lower output, the exchange 
rate tends to depreciate. For the U.S. and Taiwan, price (inflation) shocks 
increase the price level and decrease output. Whereas, Japan and Korea show 
the same effect on the price level, but their output decreases only in the short run. 
Japan's output is decreased by the price shocks only at the first quarter. 
(5) According to theory, money shocks would decrease the interest rate; with money 
illusion, output and price level would go up. The responses of output and the 
price level to monetary innovations are all found positive for the U.S., Taiwan 
and Japan. For Korea, money shocks increase output but have negative effects 
on the price level. 
( 6) Economic theory postulates that aggregate demand shocks would increase output 
and the price level only in the short run. This is shown in the case of the U.S. In 
the cases of Taiwan, Korea and Japan, aggregate demand shocks increase output 
over time. In Korea, aggregate demand shocks have temporary effects on the 
price level; but for the cases of Japan and Taiwan, the price level is not 
increased. 
(7) With a flat price level, positive nominal exchange rate shocks would increase 
real exchange rate, then decrease output and price level due to the decline in net 
exports; For the U.S. results, price level decreases in response to exchange rate 
shocks while output increased. For Japan, the price level and output are 
decreased in response to the exchange rate shocks. While in Korea, price level 
and output are found positive. In the case of Taiwan, the price level has mixed 
effects in the short run, while output decreases only in the short run. 
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8.2 Conclusion 
In comparing the results for the four countries, this paper finds that the estimated 
parameters of the contemporaneous equations might be inconsistent with each other. 
From an economic point of view, this inconsistency might result from the size of the 
economy, economic events experienced, as well as dramatic changes in policy variables, 
such as money supply and the exchange rate. The coefficient estimates from the different 
countries might not be consistent and might result in different structural shocks for 
variance decompositions and impulse responses. The reason for the difference is that 
information asymmetry and market inefficiency as well as the change of government 
policies might impact the estimates of the contemporaneous parameters, which in turn 
influence the fluctuation of economic variables and their IR.Fs and FEVDs as well. In 
addition, economic authorities might change these economic policy variables by different 
rules ( e.g., past information or rational expectation) in order to reach different economic 
goals in the short-run; moreover, some policy variables may be out of the control of 
policy makers during severe economic shocks, just like the case of Korea during the 
Financial Crisis in Asia. 
In this paper, the restricted Karras model is used for identifying impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition functions for the four countries. Based on the 
setting of the six shocks, the results of these sampled countries support the following 
propositions to some extent: 
(1) Monetary innovation increases output and price level. 
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(2) Aggregate demand disturbances increase the output for the four countries. The 
shocks increase the price level in the short run in the U.S. and Korea. In 
Taiwan and Japan, aggregate demand shocks have mildly negative effects on 
the price level. 
(3) In the cases of the U.S. and Japan, increases in the budget deficit tend to 
depreciate the exchange rate; the effect is even more obvious in the long term. 
In the cases of Taiwan and Korea, the exchange rate appreciates in response to 
the fiscal shocks. As Karras (1993) indicated, if the budget deficits are 
monetized or if budget deficits have no effect on the interest rate (Ricardian 
Equivalence holds), the exchange rate will not appreciate. 
(4) Price (inflation) shocks have permanent effects on output for the U.S. and 
Taiwan. But the results for the cases of Japan and Korea are controversial in 
that their outputs are not decreased by the inflation shocks in the medium- and 
long- run. 
(5) Price (inflation) shocks have long run effects on the price level. With rational 
expectations, people might expect higher inflation with the price shock. In the 
U.S., price (inflation) shocks have a long-run effect on the price level. This 
finding is also shown in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. 
(6) Fiscal policy, monetary policy, AS, and AD are important for the business 
variation for the four countries, though the order of significance for the four 
variables might vary. 
(7) Inflation is the mixed effect of many individual shocks-On the variation of 
price level, the U.S. economy shows that aggregate supply and M2 money are 
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more significant. For Japan, aggregate supply and oil price shocks play a more 
important role. For Korea, aggregate supply, exchange rate and oil price shocks 
are significant; and for Taiwan, the variation is explained predominantly by 
aggregate supply, followed by oil price shocks. 
(8) This research also, to some extent, supports Blanchard and Watson's view that 
monetary, fiscal, AS and AD are important sources of the variation of the 
business cycles. 
8.3 Recommendations 
The Structural VAR model has its own drawback; Keating (1992) found 
significant discrepancy existing between long-run restrictions and contemporaneous 
restrictions models. He found that the structural parameters in the long-run restrictions 
model are more precisely estimated than parameters in the contemporaneous model. The 
model with long-run restrictions yields sensible results, while the results from the 
contemporaneous model are somehow inconsistent with standard economic theories. He 
concluded that long-run structural V ARs might yield theoretically predicted results more 
frequently than V ARs identified with short-run restrictions. One reason for this, he 
mentioned, is that economic theories may often have similar long-run properties but 
different short-run features. Keating (1990) also indicated that contemporaneous zero 
restrictions may be inappropriate in an environment with forward-looking agents who 
have rational expectations. He contended that any observable contemporaneous variable 
might provide information about future events. The implication from Keating's papers is 
that different short-run restrictions can be obtained from alternative assumptions about 
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available information. For example, Stock and Watson (2001) use the "Taylor rule" in 
which the Federal Reserve is modeled as setting the interest rate based on past rates of 
inflation and unemployment to compare the forward-looking behavior, which is modeled 
as the Fed reacts to the forecast of inflation and unemployment four quarters into the 
future. 
As Lucas (1977) indicated, the change of macroeconomic policy variables is a rule 
for systematically changing that variable in response to market conditions, therefore the 
institution of a nontrivial policy would end the exogeneity and change the expectation 
formation rule and the normalized reduced form. Moreover, as indicated by Blanchard 
and Watson (1986), the accumulation of small, unimportant shocks can lead to economic 
fluctuations similar to the fluctuations caused by infrequent large shocks. If there are 
many small shocks not included in this model or if these small shocks are quantified into 
the six primary shocks used for Karras' s structural VAR model, then the impulse 
response and variance decomposition functions in our research might be smeared so as to 
reach a misleading results. Further investigation on other countries not only using 
contemporaneous restrictions but also using long-run restriction, or a mixed model may 
be helpful in finding the better result. On the other hand, it also would be interesting to 
know how business cycles responds to those shocks that are interested during recession 
and expansion periods, for different stages of economies, and for different sizes of 
economies. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE3-1 
CHANGE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE AND INFLATION 
(Annual Rate % ) 
Year Inflation Rate 
Real GNP Change of Change of Change of 
Growth Rate Weighed Producer CPI GNP 
Price Index Deflator 
1961-71 Annual 10.2 1.6 2.9 3.6 
Average 
1971 12.9 0.02 2.8 3.1 
1972 13.3 4.5 3 5.8 
1973 12.8 22.9 8.2 14.9 
1974 1.1 40.6 47.5 32.3 
1975 4.2 -5.1 5.2 2.3 
1976 13.5 2.8 2.5 5.6 
1977 9.9 2.8 7 6.2 
1978 13.9 3.5 5.8 4.7 
1979 8.1 13.8 9.8 11.3 
1980 6.6 21.5 19 16.1 
1981 5.5 7.6 16.3 12.1 
Source: Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance. 
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TABLE3-2 
VARIATION OF INFLATION RATE, IMPORT 
PRICE, AND MONEY SUPPLY 
(Annual Rate%) 
Year Change of Gross 
Price Index* 
Change of Growth Rate of 
Import Price* Money Supply (Ml)** 
1961-71 Annual 
Average 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1.6 
2.7 
0.02 
4.5 
22.9 
40.6 
-5.1 
2.8 
2.8 
3.5 
13.8 
21.5 
7.6 
1.7 
3.6 
5.1 
8 
22.1 
47 
-5 
2.1 
7.7 
9.2 
16.6 
20.2 
8.6 
Source: Directorate General of Budgets, Account & Statistics, Executive Yuan. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1981. 
Source: Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance. 
17.9 
11.3 
24.8 
37.9 
49.3 
7 
26.9 
23.1 
29.1 
34.1 
7 
19.9 
11.1 
* Change of gross price index and import price are compared with the annual average of the last 
year. 
** Money supply growth rate is calculated with the Ml by the end of each year. 
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TABLE3-3 
FACTORS OF THE CHANGE OF MONEY SUPPLY DECOMPOSITION 
(UNIT: MILLION) 
End of 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Change of 
Money Supply 
(Ml)* 
7945 
15146 
27184 
5769 
23701 
25780 
40015 
60504 
16624 
50741 
34020 
Net Change Net Change of 
of Government 
Foreign Assets Fiscal Balance 
10067 -648 
24227 -5885 
20619 -18110 
-24444 1292 
-7910 -8603 
37201 -2706 
40414 14 
61823 -24543 
-6353 -30196 
-13046 6191 
32754 31900 
Sources: Economic Research Center of Central Bank 
Change of 
Excess Money 
Supply of 
Banks** 
93 
-2461 
25762 
41977 
32839 
-7940 
-601 
17591 
68703 
71397 
5945 
Change of 
The 
Other Factors 
-1567 
-735 
-1087 
-13056 
7375 
-775 
188 
5633 
-15530 
-13801 
-36579 
* Change of Money Supply (Ml) = net change of foreign assets + net change of government fiscal 
balance + change of excess money supply of banks + change of the other factors 
** Change of Excess Money Supply of Banks = change of banks' loan and investment - ( change of 
bank's (saving+ transferable CD+ banks' net value)) 
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TABLE3-4 
INTERNATIONAL MAJOR ACCOUNTS OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(UNIT: MILLION US$) 
Current Direct Net Long-Term Basic Balance Syndicate International 
Year Account Investment Net Capital of Payments* Balance of Payments** 
1970 1 61 62 124 135 
1971 173 52 37 262 254 
1972 513 24 45 582 607 
1973 566 61 137 764 610 
1974 -1113 83 304 -726 -597 
1975 -589 34 497 -58 -149 
1976 292 68 531 891 981 
1977 920 44 305 1269 1132 
1978 1669 110 243 2022 1951 
1979 241 122 361 724 96 
1980 -965 119 1087 241 -127 
1981 497 101 738 1336 1299 
Source: Economic Research Center of Central Bank 
* Basic balance of payments= current account+ direct net investment+ long-term net capital 
** Syndicate international balance of payment= net change of foreign - country assets of domestic banks 
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TABLE3-5 
PURCHASING POWER PARITY (PPP), EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEX (EER), AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEX (REER = EER/PPP) 
Year PPP EER EER/PPP 
Export Total Export Total Export Total 
Only* Trade Only Trade Only Trade 
Value* Value Value 
1970 114 116.1 109.2 117 95.8 100.8 
1971 116.1 118.1 103.9 113.2 89.5 95.9 
1972 115.9 116.9 100 104.8 86.3 89.6 
1973 107.3 108.1 101 103.1 94.1 95.4 
1974 90.2 93.4 101.7 106.3 112.7 113.8 
1975 103.3 105.1 102.9 106.5 99.6 101.3 
1976 106.2 107.8 103.9 107.5 97.8 99.7 
1977 108.5 109.6 101.3 103.2 93.4 94.2 
1978 110.2 110.1 97.3 96.1 88.3 87.3 
1979 106.8 106.2 99.6 99.1 93.3 93.3 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1981 100.4 99.4 100.1 99.3 99.7 99.9 
Source: Directorate General of Budgets, Account & Statistics, Executive Yuan. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1981. 
Source: Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance. 
* Export value and total trade value are derived from the major trade counterparts. 
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TABLE3-6 
INTEREST RATE ADJUSTMENT ON JANUARY 27, 1974 
(UNIT: ANNUAL RATE %) 
Adjustment Date 
24-0ct-73 27-Jan-74 Net Change 
Saving Interest Rate 
One-Month CD 7 10 3 
Three-Month CD 8 11.5 3.5 
Six-Month CD 9 12.5 3.5 
Nine-Month CD 9.5 13 3.5 
One-Year CD 11 15 4 
Two-Year CD 11.5 15 3.5 
Three-Year CD 12 15 3 
Weighted Average Change Rate 3.43 
Loan Interest Rate 
Non-Mortgage Rate 13.75 17.5 3.75 
Mortgage Rate 13.25 16.5 3.25 
Weighted Average Change Rate 3.5 
Sources: Economic Research Center of Central Bank 
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Month Year 
May-73 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
Jan-74 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
TABLE3-7 
AMOUNT OF CERTIFICATE DEPOSITS AND 
CHANGE OF GROSS PRICE INDEX 
(UNIT: MONTH RATE) 
Total Sum of 
CD and Saving 
Account Deposit 
(Million NT$) 
105776 
108217 
110501 
113790 
114744 
114322 
114114 
114543 
112706 
114524 
118140 
121958 
125849 
130775 
135543 
140933 
145430 
149728 
152375 
157638 
Change of CD and 
Saving Account 
Deposit 
(Million NT$) 
3238 
2441 
2284 
3289 
954 
-422 
-208 
429 
-1837 
1818 
3616 
3818 
3891 
4926 
4768 
5390 
4497 
4298 
2647 
5263 
Growth Rate of Total 
Sum of CD and 
Saving Account 
Deposit (%) 
3.2 
2.3 
2.1 
3 
0.8 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0.4 
-1.6 
1.6 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.9 
3.6 
4 
3.2 
3 
1.8 
3.5 
Sources: Economic Research Center of Central Bank 
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Growth Rate of 
Gross Price 
Index(%) 
0.9 
2 
3.1 
4.5 
4.6 
4.3 
2.8 
4.6 
12.9 
12.9 
-1.8 
-3 
-1.8 
-1.1 
-0.9 
-0.1 
-0.9 
-1.4 
-1.5 
-0.1 
TABLE3-8 
ESTIMATED DECREASE OF TAX REVENUE IN 1974 
Tax Revenue Estimated Tax Tax Decrease 
Taxes (Billion NT$) Deduction (%) 
(Billion NT$} 
Income Tax 15.77 0.36 2.3 
Tariff 26.66 6.74 25.3 
Sales Tax 13.9 3.94 28.3 
Harbor Tax 5.88 0.07 1.2 
Total Sum 86.45 11.11 12.9 
Sources: Council of The Economic Development & Planning, Executive Yuan. 
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TABLE3-9 
THE INVESTMENT OF BIG-TEN 
INFRASTRUCTURES AND REAL GNP GROWTH RATE 
Big-Ten Infrastructures 
Year Divided By Total National Real GNP Growth Rate 
Investment (%) (%) 
1973 4.5 12.8 
1974 4.5 1.1 
1975 19.3 4.2 
1976 19.6 13.5 
1977 13.1 9.9 
1978 8.1 13.9 
Sources: Council of the Economic Development & Planning, Executive Yuan. 
Sources: Directorate-General of Budgets, Account & Statistics, Executive Yuan. 
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Ta.hie 4-1 
Variance Decompositions for The U.S. 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of Deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
4 10.9% 66.9% 5.2% 9.4% 0.8% 6.8% 
8 12.9% 63.2% 5.3% 9.1% 1.8% 7.8% 
20 13.1% 62.6% 5.3% 9.5% 1.8% 7.7% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.1% 16.8% 24.5% 28.5% 24.2% 5.8% 
4 10.8% 12.2% 16.8% 40.6% 14.1% 5.5% 
8 13.5% 7.9% 10.1% 54.6% 9.3% 4.5% 
20 9.3% 5.5% 6.8% 66.1% 8.6% 3.7% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.7% 0.2% 4.6% 20.9% 69.5% 4.2% 
4 18.5% 2.6% 4.1% 15.1% 55.8% 3.9% 
8 18.5% 2.8% 5.9% 16.5% 50.9% 5.4% 
20 17.8% 2.5% 4.9% 27.4% 42.6% 4.8% 
Percentage of Real GNP Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.7% 5.1% 76.6% 8.6% 7.3% 1.7% 
4 4.7% 5.7% 62.3% 15.9% 9.3% 2.1% 
8 17.7% 8.1% 49.0% 14.1% 8.9% 2.2% 
20 17.7% 8.3% 48.4% 14.3% 9.1% 2.2% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.6% 8.8% 0.9% 29.2% 2.0% 58.4% 
4 8.8% 9.7% 1.8% 24.4% 1.9% 53.3% 
8 8.9% 10.1% 2.3% 26.1% 3.3% 49.5% 
20 9.4% 10.3% 2.3% 26.2% 3.4% 48.4% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 13.5% 0.7% 0.2% 0.7% 0.6% 2.3% 
4 13.5% 1.0% 0.3% 0.8% 0.7% 2.4% 
8 13.5% 1.2% 0.3% 0.8% 0.7% 2.4% 
20 13.5% 1.5% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 2.5% 
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Table 4-2 
Stationarity Test for U.S. 
Using Logarithm Data from 74:01 to 101:02 with First Difference 
Testing the Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root in 
Variables ADF t-test ADFz-test Joint Test Lags 
Oil Price -7.85** -127.02** 30.82 1 
Deficit *1 -7.455** 87.5536 27.9739** 6 
Price Level -1.94 -5.99 2.22 2 
M2 -4.9283** -40.5427** 12.1452** 0 
MP2 -5.4739** -47.95** 15.01 ** 0 
Real GNP -7.04** -69.92** 24.79** 0 
Exchange Rate -8.26** -85.77** 34.15** 0 
Note: 
*1 Deficit is the ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt 
subtracted from one. 
Model Selection Criteria: Minimum AIC I Minimum BIC 
Choosing the optimal lag length for the ADF regression between O and 20 lags. 
** significant at 1 %; * significant at 5% # significant at 10% 
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.... 
w 
0 
Table 4-3 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for The U.S. Revisited 
Table 4-3 Restricted Karras models m = Ml (restricted ) 
zto = u: 
z 1 =az 1 +u 1 I I I I 
z/' = a 2 z 1° + a 3 z,P + Ui 
m_ f p y ex m z, - a4 z1 + a5z1 + a6z1 + a1z1 + u, 
yd o f ( m P) yd z, = a8 z 1 + a9 z 1 + a 10 z 1 - z, + u1 
ex _ o f p m y ex 
z, - a 11 z, + a 12 z, + a 13 z, + a 14 z, + a 1s z, + u , 
al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 alO all al2 al3 al4 al5 
coefficients 0.00000 -0.00293 4.973411 0.198507 -2.06821 -0.67032 -0.05083 0.004143 -0.1718 1.361685 0.033977 -0.48818 1.05601 -0.33083 0.011087 
standard errors 0.00000 0.013874 17 .4118 0.14525 0.569574 0.158027 0.181175 0.008913 0.185769 0.430923 0.016426 0.327219 1.090155 0.357069 0.311829 
t-stat 
significance 
level 
0.00000 -0.21096 0.28563 1.36666 -3.63116 -4.2418 -0.28056 0.4648 -0.92479 3.15993 2.06849 -1.4919 0.96868 -0.92651 0.03555 
0.00000 0.833334 0.775726 0.174738 0.000443 4.89E-05 0.779617 0.643056 0.357238 0.002072 0.041148 0.138842 0.335019 0.356391 0.971708 
Table 4-4 
Variance Decompositions for The U.S. Revisited 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.09% 94.33% 0.00% 2.86% 2.15% 0.58% 
4 3.83% 73.50% 1.41% 11.84% 2.84% 6.59% 
8 3.78% 69.94% 1.83% 14.86% 3.49% 6.09% 
20 4.00% 68.37% 2.14% 16.29% 4.03% 5.19% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 1.01% 4.10% 53.11% 34.17% 6.40% 1.20% 
4 2.49% 4.37% 37.61% 39.92% 5.48% 10.13% 
8 1.84% 3.00% 25.13% 51.05% 4.78% 14.20% 
20 1.75% 2.31% 17.07% 54.44% 12.35% 12.08% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 0.70% 2.87% 2.27% 5.22% 87.38% 1.56% 
4 8.35% 2.41% 3.79% 6.20% 75.18% 4.07% 
8 8.43% 2.41% 3.52% 7.84% 73.27% 4.53% 
20 7.96% 2.55% 3.31% 13.25% 68.29% 4.64% 
Percentage of Real GNP Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 4.79% 1.00% 27.24% 58.31% 8.30% 0.36% 
4 4.65% 1.29% 24.56% 55.16% 13.71% 0.64% 
8 4.73% 1.35% 24.16% 54.51% 14.09% 1.17% 
20 4.72% 1.51% 23.89% 54.39% 14.07% 1.43% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 4.68% 2.69% 1.93% 2.01% 2.56% 86.14% 
4 7.92% 2.90% 2.55% 1.91% 2.63% 82.10% 
8 7.75% 3.21% 3.09% 2.21% 3.14% 80.60% 
20 7.66% 4.01% 3.12% 2.69% 3.48% 79.05% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 13.49% 0.80% 0.22% 0.65% 0.69% 2.24% 
4 13.49% 1.08% 0.29% 0.75% 0.73% 2.37% 
8 13.49% 1.32% 0.36% 0.79% 0.74% 2.40% 
20 13.49% 1.72% 0.44% 0.82% 0.75% 2.43% 
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Table 5-1 
Stationarity Test for Taiwan 
Using Logarithm Data from 82:1 to 2000:4 with First Difference 
Testing the Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root in 
Variables ADF t-test ADF z-test Joint Test Lags 
Oil Price -6.92** -99.93** 23.96** 1 
Deficit*l -12.46** -101.31** 77.65** 0 
Price Level -9.51 ** -83.67** 45.27** 0 
M2 -3.38* -20.76** 5.81 * 0 
MP2 -5.79** -47.88** 16.83** 0 
Real GNP -9.33** -82.32** 43.56** 0 
Exchange Rate -6.35** -52.81 ** 20.17** 0 
Note: 
*1 Deficit is the ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt 
subtracted from one. 
Model Selection Criteria: Minimum AIC I Minimum BIC 
Choosing the optimal lag length for the ADF regression between O and 20 lags. 
** significant at 1 %; * significant at 5% # significant at 10% 
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Table 5-2 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for Taiwan 
Table 5-2 (A) Restricted Karras models m = M2 (restricted) 
0 0 
Z I = U I 
z 1 =azY+u 1 t I I t 
z,ys = a 2 z; + a 3 z/ + u(' 
m_ f p y ex m 
zt - a4zt + asz1 + a6z, + a1z1 + ut 
yd_ o f ( m P) yd z 1 - as z 1 + a 9 z 1 + a 10 z 1 - z 1 + u 1 
ex o f p m y ex z t = a 11 z 1 + a 12 z 1 + a 13 z 1 + a 14 z 1 + a is z t + u t 
al a2 a3 a4 as a6 a7 a8 a9 a!O all al2 a13 al4 al5 
...... 
w 
coefficients 0.00000 0.00000 -1.14457 0.58893 -2.59451 1.60575 -4.22029 -0.00581 0.02051 -1.34129 -0.62276 1.49358 -16.19067 -19.69407 7.44990 
""'" 
standard errors 0.00000 0.01401 0.90416 1.93672 7.16804 4.95859 15.43075 0.02167 0.02964 0.44949 0.54455 1.13806 13.04545 16.07369 6.15867 
t-stat 0.00000 -0.00019 -1.26589 0.30408 -0.36196 0.32383 -0.27350 -0.26829 0.69205 -2.98401 -1.14363 1.31239 -1.24110 -1.22524 1.20966 
significance 0.00000 0.99985 0.20975 0.76199 0.71851 0.74706 0.78530 0.78928 0.49123 0.00393 0.25685 0.19387 0.21890 0.22478 0.23066 
level 
-
(>,) 
V, 
coefficients 
standard errors 
t-stat 
significance 
level 
Table 5-2 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for Taiwan 
Table 5-2 (8) Original Karras models 
0 O 
z, = u, 
m=M2 
(unrestricted) 
z 1 =azY+uf I I I I 
z/' = a 2 z: + a 3 z{' + u; 
m _ f+ P+ y m z, - a 4z, a 5z, a 6z, + u, 
yd_ o f p m yd 
z, - a 1z, + a 8z, + a 9z, + a 10 z, + u, 
ex_ o f p m y ex z, - auz, + a12 z, + a13 z, + a14 z, + a15 z, + u, 
al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 alO all 
16.30686 -0.03488 -6.28993 -0.07255 0.07530 -0.68010 0.09685 -0.29482 1.34352 2.85392 -0.01343 
26.25227 0.05469 3.95892 0.07971 0.32850 0.49088 0.04013 0.09705 0.64396 0.97971 0.02921 
0.62116 -0.63779 -1.58880 -0.91021 0.22921 -1.38549 2.41328 -3.03771 2.08636 2.91302 -0.45974 
0.53648 0.52569 0.11661 0.36588 0.81938 0.17037 0.01851 0.00338 0.04070 0.00484 0.64719 
a12 a13 a14 a15 
0.16875 -0.95068 -0.65656 0.53294 
0.04166 0.45126 0.40310 0.32231 
4.05096 -2.10672 -1.62880 1.65351 
0.00013 0.03889 0.10805 0.10291 
.... 
\;.) 
°' 
coefficients 
standard errors 
t-stat 
significance 
level 
Table 5-2 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for Taiwan 
Table 5-2 (C) Choleski Model 
D D Zt = Vt 
f _ D f 
zt - r1zt + vt 
p - D f p zt - r2zt + r3zt + v, 
m_ o f p m z, - r4zt + r5z, + r6z, + v, 
Y_ D f p m y z, - r1zt + r8zt + r9z, + r10z, + v, 
~ _ D f p m y ~ 
zt - r11zt + r12z, + r13Z, + r14z, + r1sz, + vt 
rl r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 rll 
16.30686 -0.00994 0.02502 -0.02293 0.04485 -0.33874 0.03152 -0.16350 -0.16277 0.27988 -0.01343 
26.25227 0.00768 0.01544 0.00837 0.01655 0.13094 0.01807 0.03703 0.27561 0.24726 0.02921 
0.62116 -1.29436 1.62014 -2.73883 2.70926 -2.58691 1.74438 -4.41541 -0.59060 1.13193 -0.45974 
0.53648 0.19979 0.10970 0.00784 0.00850 0.01180 0.08561 0.00004 0.55675 0.26164 0.64719 
r12 r13 r14 r15 
0.16875 -0.95068 -0.65656 0.53294 
0.04166 0.45126 0.40310 0.32231 
4.05096 -2.10672 -1.62880 1.65351 
0.00013 0.03889 0.10805 0.10291 
Table 5-3 
Variance Decompositions for Taiwan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of Deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
0.0% 96.3% 0.1% 0.4% 3.2% 0.0% 
4 2.6% 74.8% 5.2% 11.2% 2.8% 3.5% 
8 5.7% 68.1% 8.8% 11.2% 2.9% 3.4% 
20 12.6% 59.7% 11.7% 10.3% 2.6% 3.1% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
28.3% 0.4% 61.4% 2.5% 3.2% 4.3% 
4 31.0% 0.5% 59.0% 2.5% 2.6% 4.5% 
8 35.3% 0.8% 54.4% 3.2% 2.5% 4.0% 
20 37.7% 0.9% 51.1% 3.9% 2.5% 3.9% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 10.0% 15.3% 1.7% 7.6% 35.8% 29.4% 
4 20.9% 13.6% 2.3% 6.4% 28.5% 28.3% 
8 20.5% 13.4% 2.1% 6.1% 28.3% 29.6% 
20 19.9% 13.5% 2.7% 6.5% 27.7% 29.7% 
Percentage of Real GNP Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 4.0% 7.7% 1.5% 8.4% 56.6% 21.9% 
4 5.4% 7.3% 11.8% 10.7% 44.6% 20.2% 
8 13.4% 7.2% 14.0% 9.8% 36.9% 18.7% 
20 13.9% 6.8% 17.9% 9.9% 33.7% 17.8% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 1.5% 20.7% 2.8% 73.0% 2.0% 0.1% 
4 9.1% 16.3% 5.0% 60.1% 9.4% 0.1% 
8 11.9% 17.2% 4.9% 56.0% 9.0% 1.0% 
20 11.9% 17.3% 5.2% 55.3% 9.1% 1.2% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 14.4% 9.1% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 2.7% 
4 14.4% 10.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.0% 3.1% 
8 14.4% 11.3% 1.0% 1.4% 1.2% 3.3% 
20 14.4% 12.1% 1.1% 1.5% 1.2% 3.3% 
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Table 5-4 
Variance Decompositions for Taiwan (Unrestricted Karras Model) 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of Deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 4.2% 30.4% 2.5% 49.6% 13.2% 0.2% 
4 5.3% 24.1% 7.4% 36.4% 14.5% 12.3% 
8 7.0% 23.3% 10.4% 34.1% 13.3% 11.9% 
20 13.0% 20.6% 13.5% 30.1% 11.9% 10.8% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 24.0% 2.5% 66.3% 0.7% 2.0% 4.4% 
4 26.2% 2.4% 64.2% 1.0% 3.0% 3.3% 
8 30.3% 2.5% 59.5% 1.1% 3.0% 3.6% 
20 33.0% 2.4% 55.8% 1.4% 3.4% 3.9% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 9.4% 3.7% 1.6% 65.6% 19.1% 0.7% 
4 26.1% 4.2% 2.1% 49.5% 17.4% 0.7% 
8 28.1% 3.9% 1.8% 48.3% 17.2% 0.7% 
20 28.6% 3.9% 2.2% 47.6% 17.0% 0.7% 
Percentage of Real GNP Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 1.6% 74.4% 1.0% 15.7% 4.9% 2.5% 
4 6.6% 56.1% 11.0% 13.7% 8.7% 3.9% 
8 16.2% 44.8% 13.6% 13.0% 8.4% 4.1% 
20 16.8% 39.8% 17.7% 12.9% 8.5% 4.2% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate ,Variance Explained by Shock to 
I 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 5.3% 0.8% 1.0% 15.3% 12.6% 65.1% 
4 10.9% 2.2% 4.2% 18.9% 10.3% 53.4% 
8 15.7% 2.3% 4.1% 18.7% 11.0% 48.2% 
20 15.8% 2.3% 4.6% 18.9% 10.9% 47.5% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 14.4% 9.1% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 2.7% 
4 14.4% 10.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.0% 3.1% 
8 14.4% 11.3% 1.0% 1.4% 1.2% 3.3% 
20 14.4% 12.1% 1.1% 1.5% 1.2% 3.3% 
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Table 5-5 
Variance Decompositions for Taiwan (Choleski Model) 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of Deficit Variance Explained by Shock. to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 0.1% 92.2% 0.1% 0.3% 6.8% 0.4% 
4 1.8% 72.9% 5.0% 10.9% 5.1% 4.3% 
8 4.4% 67.2% 8.6% 10.9% 4.9% 4.1% 
20 10.5% 59.5% 11.5% 10.1% 4.5% 3.9% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 28.1% 0.9% 62.5% 2.5% 2.2% 3.9% 
4 29.2% 0.9% 61.1% 2.5% 1.9% 4.4% 
8 33.1% 1.2% 56.6% 3.2% 1.9% 4.0% 
20 35.3% 1.3% 53.3% 4.0% 1.9% 4.1% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 9.5% 12.2% 1.9% 7.3% 36.7% 32.4% 
4 20.2% 11.6% 2.5% 6.1% 28.8% 30.8% 
8 20.3% 11.3% 2.2% 5.7% 28.6% 31.9% 
20 20.0% 11.4% 2.8% 6.0% 28.1% 31.7% 
Percentage of Real GNP Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 3.5% 22.5% 1.1% 6.3% 51.9% 14.8% 
4 5.3% 18.7% 11.1% 9.0% 40.7% 15.2% 
8 12.8% 16.5% 13.5% 8.4% 34.1% 14.8% 
20 13.1% 15.1% 17.4% 8.7% 31.3% 14.5% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 1.8% 17.7% 2.5% 74.7% 3.2% 0.0% 
4 9.1% 13.9% 4.9% 61.7% 10.1% 0.3% 
8 12.1% 14.5% 4.9% 57.4% 9.9% 1.3% 
20 12.1% 14.5% 5.2% 56.7% 10.0% 1.4% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 14.4% 9.3% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 2.9% 
4 14.4% 11.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.1% 3.3% 
8 14.4% 11.7% 1.0% 1.3% 1.2% 3.4% 
20 14.4% 12.4% 1.1% 1.4% 1.3% 3.5% 
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Table 6-1 
Stationarity Test for Japan 
Using Logarithm data from 1984:01 to 2001 :02 with First Difference 
Testing the Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root in 
Variables ADFt-test ADFz-test Joint Test Lags 
Oil Price -4.92** -292.93** 12.12 3 
Deficit *1 -11.92** -96.37** 71.22** 0 
Price Level -8.60** -74.37** 37.08** 0 
M2 -1.55 -6.57 1.42 1 
MP2 -7.28** -61.92** 26.58** 0 
RealGNI -6.47** -59.47** 21.03** 0 
Exchange Rate -6.57** -54.38** 21.62** 0 
Note: 
* 1 Deficit is the ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt 
subtracted from one. 
Model Selection Criteria: Minimum AIC I Minimum BIC 
Choosing the optimal lag length for the ADF regression between O and 20 lags. 
** significant at 1 %; * significant at 5% # significant at 10% 
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.i:,.. 
coefficients 
standard errors 
t-stat 
Table 6-2 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for Japan 
Table 6-2 Restricted Karras models m=M2 (restricted: ) 
0 0 
z I = U I 
z 1 =az>'+u 1 I I I I 
z,ys = a 2 z 1° + a 3 z/ + u;' 
m_ f p y ex m z, - a4 z, + a5z, + a6z1 + a7 z, + u, 
yd _ o f ( m _ P) yd z, - a8z, + a9 z, + a10 z, z, + u, 
ex _ o f p m y ex 
z, - a 11 z, + a 12 z, + a 13 z, + a 14 z, + a 1s z, + u , 
al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 alO all al2 a13 a14 al5 
0.00000 0.017262 -1.94514 0.014388 -0.37034 0.054245 0.637444 -1.17674 -0.22269 -2.903 0.025775 -0.83427 -1.66339 0.357827 -1.45846 
0.00000 0.016883 1.111397 0.008172 0.11661 0.130687 0.191055 1.260809 0.266046 3.177646 0.030122 0.423224 0.480834 0.385061 0.966747 
0.00000 1.02244 -1.75017 1.76064 -3.17592 0.41507 3.33644 -0.93333 -0.83702 -0.91357 0.85567 -1.97123 -3.45939 0.92927 -1.50863 
significance level 0.00000 0.310422 0.084881 0.083231 0.002328 0.679521 0.001438 0.354215 0.405747 0.364426 0.395529 0.053239 0.000994 0.356411 0.136557 
Table 6-3 
Variance Decompositions for Japan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of Deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 2.4% 92.8% 1.0% 0.3% 3.4% 0.1% 
4 13.0% 63.2% 11.6% 3.6% 7.3% 1.5% 
8 15.4% 55.6% 10.1% 7.5% 9.7% 1.8% 
20 17.1% 52.0% 10.6% 8.6% 9.7% 2.0% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 5.9% 0.7% 87.2% 3.6% 1.5% 1.1% 
4 14.9% 4.3% 62.1% 13.6% 1.9% 3.2% 
8 19.0% 5.2% 53.5% 15.4% 3.3% 3.5% 
20 28.3% 6.1% 45.0% 13.8% 3.5% 3.3% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 9.1% 5.0% 6.5% 34.9% 39.2% 5.4% 
4 46.5% 4.0% 5.7% 18.4% 16.9% 8.6% 
8 47.5% 3.9% 10.0% 16.8% 14.5% 7.3% 
20 52.3% 3.1% 12.9% 13.9% 11.8% 6.0% 
Percentage of Real GNI Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 6.5% 11.9% 4.5% 35.6% 37.6% 3.8% 
4 24.6% 12.9% 8.2% 24.2% 25.9% 4.1% 
8 24.5% 14.0% 12.7% 23.7% 20.9% 4.2% 
20 32.4% 10.7% 16.5% 19.6% 16.7% 4.2% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 4.6% 5.4% 13.3% 6.8% 4.2% 65.8% 
4 17.7% 11.1% 12.5% 12.1% 3.0% 43.5% 
8 17.2% 14.5% 15.0% 13.4% 4.2% 35.8% 
20 17.0% 14.6% 16.7% 14.6% 4.1% 32.9% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 14.5% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% 0.4% 3.1% 
4 14.5% 1.2% 0.9% 1.6% 0.5% 3.9% 
8 14.5% 1.3% 1.0% 1.8% 0.6% 4.4% 
20 14.5% 1.4% 1.2% 2.2% 0.7% 4.6% 
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Table 7-1 
Stationarity Test for Korea 
Using Logarithm data from 1982:1 to 2000:2 with First Difference 
TESTING THE NULL HYPOTHESIS OF A UNIT ROOT IN 
Variables ADFt-test ADFz-test Joint Test 
Oil Price -7.09** -114.89** 25.22 
Deficit *1 -9.07** 788.56 41.19** 
Price Level -8.15** -69.47** 33.32** 
M2 -7.54** -66.65** 28.47** 
MP2 -3.69** -29.38** 6.81 ** 
Real GNI -10.46** 17.65 60.25** 
Exchange Rate -11.53** -96.27** 66.56** 
Note: 
Lags 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 
13 
0 
*1 Deficit is the ratio of the logarithm of the real government deficit to government debt subtracted 
from one. 
Model Selection Criteria: MinimumAIC I Minimum BIC 
Choosing the optimal lag length for the ADF regression between O and 20 lags. 
** significant at 1 %; * significant at 5% # significant at 10% 
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coefficients 
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Table 7-2 
Estimated Contemporaneous Coefficients for Korea 
Table 7-2 Restricted Karras model 
0 
z t 
0 
= u t 
z 1 =azY+u 1 I I I t 
m=M2 (restricted: ) 
ys _ o p ys 
z, - a 2 z, + a 3 z, + u, 
m_ .f p y ex m 
z, - a4z1 + a5z1 + a6z1 + a7z1 + u, 
yd · o . f· ( m P) yd z 1 = a 8z 1 + a 9z 1 + a 10 z, - z, + u, 
ex o f p m 
z1 = a 11 z 1 + a 12 z 1 + a 13 z 1 + a 14 z, 
al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 
0.0000 0.0581 5.8704 -0.0381 -1.6369 -0.0388 0.2183 
0.0000 0.6511 17.7944 0.0498 0.6303 0.0197 0.3062 
0.0000 0.0892 0.3299 -0.7656 -2.5971 -1.9708 0.7128 
0.0000 0.9292 0.7425 0.4467 0.0116 0.0529 0.4785 
y ex 
+ a 1s z, + u, 
a8 a9 alO al 1 
-3.3726 -2.3012 64.0902 -0.1985 
2.3630 1.9821 36.7007 0.1017 
-1.4273 -1.1610 1.7463 -1.9528 
0.1581 0.2498 0.0853 0.0551 
a12 al3 a14 al5 
0.0345 -2.5655 -2.2471 -0.0493 
0.1046 0.8969 0.7060 0.0385 
0.3298 -2.8605 -3.1830 -1.2798 
0.7427 0.0057 0.0022 0.2052 
Table 7-3 
Variance Decompositions For Korea (Restricted Karras Model) 
Percentage of OIL Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
4 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
8 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
20 100.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Percentage of deficit Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 2.2% 89.8% 5.0% 1.0% 0.4% 1.6% 
4 5.7% 78.6% 5.4% 4.7% 1.8% 3.9% 
8 8.2% 75.9% 5.2% 4.6% 2.1% 3.9% 
20 8.7% 75.0% 5.2% 4.7% 2.2% 4.2% 
Percentage of Price Level Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
9.7% 3.9% 60.0% 2.5% 0.1% 23.9% 
4 21.3% 10.9% 45.5% 2.8% 1.2% 18.4% 
8 24.9% 11.1% 42.0% 2.6% 2.3% 17.2% 
20 24.7% 11.2% 41.7% 2.6% 2.7% 17.0% 
Percentage of Monetary (M2) Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS AD Monetary Exchange 
1 0.4% 10.7% 4.9% 0.9% 82.8% 0.3% 
4 4.3% 8.9% 10.2% 2.5% 69.5% 4.5% 
8 6.2% 8.2% 10.9% 2.7% 65.4% 6.5% 
20 7.9% 8.5% 10.8% 2.7% 63.4% 6.7% 
Percentage of Real GNI Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange. 
1 1.4% 0.8% 0.4% 90.6% 2.8% 4.0% 
4 4.4% 3.7% 0.6% 82.2% 5.3% 3.7% 
8 4.8% 4.0% 0.9% 79.9% 6.3% 4.1% 
20 5.1% 4.0% 0.9% 79.4% 6.3% 4.3% 
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Percentage of Exchange Rate Variance Explained by Shock to 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 6.0% 8.9% 0.1% 4.8% 9.6% 70.6% 
4 16.1% 7.8% 0.8% 4.6% 12.9% 57.8% 
8 16.9% 9.6% 1.0% 4.8% 12.9% 54.9% 
20 17.3% 9.6% 1.0% 5.1% 12.8% 54.2% 
Forecast Mean Squared Error 
Horizon (Quarters) Oil Deficit AS Monetary AD Exchange 
1 14.0% 12.7% 1.7% 1.7% 34.5% 8.6% 
4 14.0% 14.2% 1.9% 2.1% 36.5% 9.6% 
8 14.0% 14.8% 2.0% 2.2% 37.5% 9.9% 
20 14.0% 14.9% 2.0% 2.2% 37.6% 9.9% 
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APPENDIXB 
Figure 4-1 The Case of U.S. (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 4-1 (a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
Oil Shocks 
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Figure 4-1 (b) Accumulated Response of Output to 
Fiscai Shocks 
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I-OUTPUT! 
I-OUTPUT! 
Figure 4-1 ( c) Accumulated Response of Output to 
Price Shocks 
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Figure 4-1 ( d) Accumulated Response of Output to 
M oneta-y Shocks 
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Figure 4-1 ( e) Accumulated Response of Output to 
Demand Shocks 
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Figure 4-1 (t) Accumulated Response of Output to 
Exchange Rate Shocks 
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Figure 4-2 The Case of U.S. (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 4-2 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
Oil Shocks 
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Figure 4-2 (b) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
Fiscal Shocks 
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Figure 4-2 ( c) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
Price Shocks 
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Figure 4-2 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
M oneta-y Shocks 
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Figure 4-2 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
Dema-d 9icx::ks 
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Figure 4-2 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
Exchange Rate Shocks 
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Figure 4-3 The Case of U.S. (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 4-3 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
Oil Shocks 
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Figure 4-3 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
Fiscal Shocks 
i~EXCHANGERATEI 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
157 
Figure 4-3 ( c) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 4-3 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 4-3 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-1 The Case of Taiwan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-1 (a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
OIL SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-1 (b) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-1 ( c) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-1 (d) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-1 ( e) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-2 The Case of Taiwan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-2 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-2 (b) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-2 (c) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-2 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-2 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-2 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-3 The Case of Taiwan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-3 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-3 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-3 (c)Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
PRICE SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-3 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
DEMAND SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-3 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-3 (f) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
EXCHANGE RA TE SHOCKS 
I- EXCHANGE RATE I 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
168 
0 
-0.001 
-0.002 
-0.003 
-0.004 
-0.005 
-0.006 
-0.007 
-0.008 
Figure 5-4 The Case of Taiwan (Unrestricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-4 (a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
OIL SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-4 (c) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-4 (d) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-4 (e)Accumulated Response of Output to 
DEMAND SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-4 (f) Accumulated Response of Output to 
EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-5 The Case of Taiwan (unrestricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-5 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
OIL SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-5 (b) Accumulated Response of price Level to 
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Figure 5-5 ( c) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
PRICE SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-5 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-5 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-5 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-6 The Case of Taiwan (Unrestricted Karras Model) 
Figure 5-6 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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0.02 .--------------------------, 
0.018 ,___ _____________________ _, 
0.016 t----t----+--------------------1 
0.014 t----1----+---------------------l 
0.012 1-------1-----+-----------------------1 
0.01 
0.008 
0.006 
0.004 .....----------\------~---------------< 
0.002 i------------~,,,_ ______________ -----1 
0 t---'-~-'--'------'----'-'---'-~-'--'---'-----"'--.,__--'------=.......------.!;=-'------1 
-0.002 ~----------------------~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
i~EXCHANGERATEj 
Figure 5-6 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-6 ( c) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
PRICE SHOCKS 
0.003 ...--------------------------. 
0.002 l-----Jlf------------------------1 
0.001 >-----+--+------------------------; 
0 1--~f-"--+-~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-------1 
-0.001 1-----1------\-----------------------l 
-0.002 ,_,. ______________________ ------< 
-0.003 1------+--------------------
-0.004 1--------\-----------....:---------~~""""'=,-----------J 
-0.005 
-0.006 l----------~+---------------
-0.007 .__ ______________________ __. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
\-EXCHANGE RATE I 
Figure 5-6 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
MONETARY SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-6 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-6 (f) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
EXCHANGE RA TE 9-IOCKS 
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Figure 5-7 The Case of Taiwan (Choleski Decomposition) 
Figure 5-7 ( a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
OIL SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-7 ( c) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-7 ( e) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-7 (t) Acc1Jmulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 5-8 The Case of Taiwan (Choleski Decomposition) 
Figure 5-8 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-8 (b) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-8 ( c) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-8 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-8 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-8 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 5-9 The Case of Taiwan (Choleski Decomposition) 
Figure 5-9 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-9 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
FISCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 5-9 ( c) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-9 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
MONETARY SHOCKS 
1~EXCHANGERATEI 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
185 
Figure 5-9 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-9 (t) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 5-10 Identified Structural Shocks for Restricted Karras Model 
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Figure 5-10 (b) Structural Fiscal Shocks 
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Figure .5-10 (c) Structural Price Shocks 
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Figure 5-10 (d) Structural Monetary Shocks 
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Figure s~t O ( e) Structural Demand Shocks 
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Figure 5-10 (t) Structural Exchange Rate Shocks 
Exchange Ratte 
0.3 
I 
I 0.25 
f 
0.2 
t I 
I\ !\. \ f 
' 
~ I 
\/ T .\ ~I t I \ .t.1 
" \ ''¥' '?\'I T' '/I \ I I'' I \J I V J lJ l/ ¥ / ,,,. 
u ' • I 
I 
I 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
-0.05 
-0.1 
-0.15 
-0.2 
-0.25 
83:02 84:02 85:02 86:02 87:02 88:02 89:02 90:02 91:02 92:02 93:02 94:02 95:02 96:02 97:02 98:02 99:02 100:02 
189 
Figure 6-1 The Case of Japan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 6-1 (a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 6-1 (b) Accumulated Response of Output to 
FISCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-1 (d) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 6-1 ( e) Accumulated Response of Output to 
DEMAND SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-1 (t) Accumulated Response of Output to 
EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-2 The Case of Japan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 6-2 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
OIL SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-2 (b) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
FISCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-2 ( c) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
PRICE SHOCKS 
0.018 
~ 
~ 
~ 
/ 
\ r 
V 
0.016 
0.014 
0.012 
0.01 
0.008 
0.006 
0.004 
0.002 
0 
I 
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Figure 6-2 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 6-2 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
DEMAND S:·KXJ<S 
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Figure 6-2 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 6-3 The Case of Japan (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 6-3 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 6-3 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 6-3 ( c) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 6-3 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 6-3 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
DEMAND SHOCKS 
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Figure 6-3 (t) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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Figure 7-1 The Case of Korea (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 7-1 (a) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 7-1 (b) Accumulated Response of Output to 
FIOCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-1 (c) Accumulated Response of Output to 
ffi!CE 9-IOCKS 
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Figure 7-1 (d) Accumulated Response of Output to 
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Figure 7-1 (e) Accumulated Response of Output to 
DEMAND SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-1 (f) Accumulated Response of Output to 
EXCHANGE RA TE SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-2 The Case of Korea (Restricted Karras Model) 
Figure 7-2 (a) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 7-2 (b) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
FISCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-2 (c)Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
PRICE SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-2 ( d) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 7-2 ( e) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
DEMAND 9-IOO<S 
0.002 .---------------------------------, 
0 
-0.002 
-0.()()4 !---------'<------------------------! 1__ _ 
1-PRlcel 
-0.000 
-O.Q12 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Figure 7-2 (f) Accumulated Response of Price Level to 
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Figure 7-3 The Case of Korea 
Figure 7-3 (a) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
OIL 9-lOCKS 
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Figure 7-3 (b) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
FISCAL SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-3 ( c) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
ffil CE 9-IOCKS 
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Figure 7-3 ( d) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
MONETARY SHOCKS 
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Figure 7-3 ( e) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
DEMAND &IOCKS 
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Figure 7-3 (f) Accumulated Response of Exchange Rate to 
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